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Abstract 
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in British Columbia has recently embarked on a journey 
to reduce crime, reduce fear of crime, and increase public confidence in the criminal justice system 
through the implementation of Crime Reduction (CR) strategies that involve targeted police action 
toward prolific offenders, crime hot spots, and responding to the underlying causes of crime. While the 
CR effort is new to the province, success is already being declared on RCMP websites. Although 
property crime rates are down in many CR detachment areas, what police officers in these locations 
are actually doing to engage in CR is not clear. This major paper examined police officers’ views and 
experiences with CR Strategies through an empirical survey of the police officers of the Coquitlam 
RCMP Detachment. The survey results suggested that, although great achievements have been made in 
incorporating CR in day-to-day policing activities, some gaps remain in the implementation of CR. 
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Introduction 
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in British Columbia has recently 
embarked on a journey to reduce crime, reduce fear of crime, and increase public 
confidence in the criminal justice system through the implementation of strategies that 
involve the basic tenets of Crime Reduction (CR) initiatives: targeted police action 
toward prolific offenders; crime hot spots; and responding to the underlying causes of 
crime. While the CR effort is very new to the province, success is already being declared. 
For example, the RCMP public website states: 
Within a very short time that is exactly what is happening - from the roll-out at 
our first pilot sites, and at the other locations that implemented some of the basic 
components of the strategy. There has been a drop in crime rates in several pilot 
sites, particularly property crime, and there has been a shift in awareness and 
culture. Significant support at the municipal level and a build-up of analytical 
capacity has also been realized…1 
 
The implementation of CR is also credited with a significant transformation within the 
RCMP. In the RCMP 2006-2007 Year in Review, a document published on the RCMP 
website, Pacific Region Deputy Commissioner Gary Bass concluded that he was “very 
proud of the support from members, employees, and partners who have embraced the CR 
philosophy wholeheartedly and have made the success we have seen to this point 
possible” (RCMP, 2007). 
The initial interest in the crime reduction philosophy motivated many RCMP 
Detachments to alter their daily operations to become CR Detachments. This change 
required a number of adjustments on the part of their police officers. This adaptation, 
however, has remained largely unexamined. With this in mind, this paper will examine 
                                                 
1 Retrieved on 2008-07-15 from www.rcmp-grc.ca 
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the claims made by the RCMP by posing a number of questions regarding the nature and 
extent of the CR implementation thus far, with particular attention to the extent to which 
RCMP officers have truly embraced the key elements of CR. More specifically, this 
major paper will focus on an early CR pilot site, the Coquitlam RCMP Detachment, and 
the response of its police officers to four basic questions:  
(1) Have Coquitlam Detachment police officers embraced the elements of CR?; 
(2) What are their views and experiences with CR?; 
(3) To what extent are Coquitlam detachment police officers engaged in CR?; and 
(4) Are Coquitlam Detachment police officers ‘walking the walk’ or just ‘talking 
the talk’ with respect to CR? 
 
An examination of the RCMP acceptance and implementation of CR is timely and 
important. Over the past three years, detachment commanders from several police 
detachments within the RCMP, as well as other police agencies in several other 
provinces, have looked to the CR initiatives in BC as a model for their own initiatives.2 
Depending on the success of these initiatives, CR may ultimately become a national 
initiative and could then be implemented in the over 750 RCMP Detachments throughout 
Canada.  
The CR initiative undertaken by the British Columbia RCMP was inspired by the 
success of similar initiatives in the United Kingdom (UK). The UK CR Program was a 
£250 million program implemented over three years commencing in April 1999. In the 
UK, CR was and is a complex plan designed to operate within a multi-agency mixed 
sector framework across every level of government. It encompassed action at the 
national, regional, and local levels of government (Homel, Nutley, Webb, and Tilley, 
2004). 
                                                 
2  I am aware of this due to my current role as a CR liaison at RCMP “E” Division Headquarters. 
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In the UK, CR was initiated by the State through the 1998 Crime and Disorder 
Act. The Crime and Disorder Act created a legislative framework for various agencies to 
work on locally agreed upon public safety initiatives. This law was enacted by the UK 
Home Office to encourage the creation of initiatives to reduce crime and disorder in 
every county, district, city, and borough in England. The Act required local governments 
to act in co-operation with police, probation, and health authorities in formulating and 
implementing a strategy for the reduction of crime and disorder in each community. The 
Crime and Disorder Act essentially tied these government bodies together under the law 
and, from the start, was a state-run initiative.3 This state-anchoring is a distinctive 
characteristic of the UK CR approach. UK criminologist Adam Crawford stated that “it 
suggests that far from state withdrawal, in relation to the regulation of social behaviour, 
the British state is engaged in ambitious projects of social engineering in which the 
deployment of hierarchy, command and interventionism are prevalent” (Crawford, 2006: 
450). 
The UK CR Program components included a wide range of reforms and 
initiatives, such as improved inter-agency partnerships, working with families and youth 
to prevent crime, working with prolific offenders to reduce their offending, engaging in 
situational crime control, and improving sentencing practices. Early initiatives included 
burglary reduction programs, problem oriented policing and targeted policing, drug 
intervention programs, drug arrest referrals, intervention work in schools and with at-risk 
families, domestic violence reduction programs, CCTV initiatives, and tackling 
                                                 
3 UK Crime and Disorder Act 1998 Chapter 37 
Retrieved on 2006-11-19 from:  
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980037.htm  
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prostitution initiatives (Bullock, Farrell, and Tilley, 2002; Chapman and Niven, 2000; 
Tilley, 2004; Homel, Nutley, Webb, and Tilley; 2004). 
For police officers, CR in the UK meant a renewed interest in partnership building 
with other criminal justice agencies, such as probation officials and Crown prosecutors, 
as well as improved inter-agency cooperation/coordination with various social services 
agencies. Far from simply responding to calls for service, UK police officers were 
expected to form teams with probation officers, housing, and addictions services agencies 
as these inter-agency teams conduct enhanced follow-up and referral services to selected 
prolific offenders; those known to be causing the most harm in their communities.  
The emphasis on targeting prolific offenders required more openness on the part 
of the police to non-enforcement alternatives to reduce the recidivism of criminals. For 
instance, police officers had to have a greater appreciation for the common reality that 
substance abuse and/or mental health were the causes of an offender’s criminality, rather 
than simple criminal deviance. CR demanded that police officers shift their focus from 
the offence to the offender and from the crime to the criminal. 
The management of prolific offenders also required more deliberate attention to 
intelligence received on local minor offenders, such as low level drug traffickers, auto 
and petty thieves, as well as to intelligence received on their criminal associates. This 
intelligence could then be forwarded to crime analysts as CR implied a broader reliance 
on crime analysis for the collation and analysis of this intelligence for various future 
enforcement purposes. 
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 The CR Program in the UK enjoyed a high level of political support which made 
creating partnerships from the bottom-up unnecessary as full co-operation was legislated. 
The UK CR programs were also fully funded. Even as the responsibility of CR strategies 
shifted to local communities through local area agreements, the financial commitment 
and infrastructure put in place by the federal government remained intact.4  
While these initiatives shared common ground with those of British Columbia, the 
initiatives undertaken in BC differ in an important aspect: they were not a result of top 
down government policy decisions. Instead, the police are more than a partner in CR 
initiatives; they are the catalyst for them. Quite contrary to the UK experience, the BC 
CR program implementation has been a bottom-up exercise. This has allowed for a 
variety of implementation styles to develop in BC. Moreover, no new funds were infused 
for this initiative. 
 An early interest in developing a comprehensive CR strategy in British Columbia 
was first expressed by the RCMP in BC. In a 2005 BC RCMP internal communication, 
Deputy Commissioner Gary Bass defined the CR Strategy as “a consultative, research-
based approach to reducing crime by targeting police actions toward high-volume 
offenders, known crime hot spots, and the underlining causes of crime” (“E” Div 
communication, June 2005). This proactive, research-based, crime fighting initiative was 
modeled after similar initiatives in the UK, but would have a distinctly Canadian twist. 
The key components of the new direction were outlined for the BC RCMP in the 2005 
CR Strategy Strategic Communications Plan: prolific offenders; crime hot spots; and 
crime causation. The key principles of CR became partnerships, improved accountability, 
                                                 
4 The UK government has provided information regarding funding sources on its CR website: 
http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/funding/funding.htm 
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and evidence-based approaches to crime. The RCMP CR initiative began, and pilot CR 
sites were launched in six BC communities.5 CR ideas also spread to other RCMP 
detachments and municipal police departments.6 Initial evaluations demonstrated that 
these communities achieved better than average crime reduction.7 
CR strategies are premised on evidence and the law of diminishing returns. CR 
offers an opportunity to better address policing demands by better directing resources to 
the people, places, and problems that cause the community the most harm. Crime analysis 
allows detachments to identify priority problem locations, repeat offenders, and chronic 
community disorder issues. CR requires detachments to identify real problems through 
intelligent analysis and find lasting solutions to those problems. CR also demands higher 
level partnership building with the community and at an inter-agency level. In short, for 
the RCMP in BC, CR is problem-solving at the police detachment management level and 
at the inter-governmental agency level. In general, CR implementation in most BC 
RCMP jurisdictions incorporated the preceding elements, yet the types of strategies 
undertaken in detachments varied. 
The initial CR pilot locations have enjoyed flexibility in how they implemented 
CR. For instance, the Courtenay/Comox RCMP Detachment developed a more 
comprehensive strategy for identifying and selecting prolific offenders. The 
                                                 
5 The six original pilot sites were: Courtenay/Comox, Coquitlam, Fraser Lake, Penticton, Port McNeil, and 
Ridge Meadows. 
6 Other CR police offices are: Abbotsford, Burnaby, Chilliwack, Kamloops, Nanaimo, Surrey, to name a 
few.   
7 Early findings demonstrate that these strategies are working: crime numbers are decreasing in these pilot 
test sites. The RCMP public website indicates that there are ‘Positive Outcomes from Initial Steps” of CR. 
These include significant reductions in property crimes (year-on-year drops of 10 - 40% in targeted crimes 
in pilot areas) as the rates of property crime decline in pilot locations and are substantially ahead of national 
patterns. The 2004-06 change in property crime rates are: Canada, down 10%; “E" Division, down 15%; 
CR Pilot sites, down 27%. This information was obtained on 2008-06-01 from the RCMP public website: 
http://bc.rcmp.ca/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=57&languageId=1&contentId=643. 
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Courtenay/Comox RCMP Detachment also saw CR as an opportunity to develop and 
improve internal morale through the implementation of a Continuous Improvement Team 
management accountability framework which amplified the communication between the 
police officers on the beat and their management team. In Kamloops, the RCMP 
Detachment saw CR as an opportunity to invest in a monitoring and surveillance program 
for repeat offenders. In effect, police officers began surveillance of top offenders, while 
newly hired civilian crime analysts developed effective information sharing protocols 
with the local correctional facility and developed a rigorous electronic offender tracking 
system. This also allowed Kamloops RCMP to better track sex offenders at-large in their 
jurisdiction. Kamloops RCMP officers made an effort to conduct lifestyle interviews on 
prolific offenders and attempted to make appropriate referrals to outside agencies 
whenever possible. Police officers in Kamloops found that CR strategies were a good fit 
to assist in building partnerships in their prostitution reduction efforts. 
 The Coquitlam RCMP Detachment became a CR pilot site in 2005. Coquitlam 
Detachment saw CR as an opportunity to increase the detachment management’s 
accountability by implementing a management strategy based on COMPSTAT, crime 
analysis, and problem solving with the central aim of targeting prolific offenders. The 
management of this detachment focused on the tenets of CR that they felt were most 
likely to influence crime rates. These elements were: accountability; prolific offenders; 
and crime hot spots. They acted on these concepts by adopting a crime statistics 
recording system that took into account several years of crime data. They then initiated 
tactics that aimed to reduce those numbers. The following are examples of some of those 
plans: (1) The detachment hired a Crime Analyst to increase their ability to respond to 
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crime patterns; (2) The detachment hired a Communications Strategist to assist with 
informing the general public about the efforts undertaken and successes achieved; and (3) 
The detachment organizational chart was altered and personnel resources from 
Community Policing and General Duty sections were converted into a CR Unit that had 
as its primarily mission the targeted enforcement of prolific offenders. These and other 
aspects of the Coquitlam CR implementation are further outlined in Chapter Two.  
To understand the perspective of this writer, I am an RCMP Constable. My 
current post in the RCMP is that of Policy Reviewer/Analyst in CR Strategies Liaison 
Section at “E” Division Headquarters in Vancouver. My current tasks include assistance 
and support to detachments with regards to communications, training and knowledge 
transfer of CR Initiatives. Before my transfer to Headquarters in October 2006, I was a 
member of the Coquitlam RCMP detachment. I was a witness to, and participant in, the 
first two years of the CR implementation in that location. I was fortunate to be selected as 
a member of the original ‘Crime Reduction Unit’ that was tasked primarily with the 
identification, tracking, surveillance, and enforcement of prolific offenders. I can 
personally attest to the fact that, for police officers on the street, the early stage of CR 
implementation meant losing members from your watch to this newly minted, yet 
untested section. It initially meant an increased file load per first responder. It also meant 
more paperwork, such as the writing of substantially longer, more comprehensive Crown 
reports on prolific offenders. My experience in this CR detachment is the reason I 
became interested in the topic of CR implementation from a research perspective. I felt 
that the initiative was a good idea despite the growing pains, but I wanted to test that 
belief.  
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 This major paper provides an examination of the views and experiences of RCMP 
officers in one of the initial CR pilot sites, the Coquitlam Detachment. The paper is 
organized into four chapters. Chapter One will discuss the long history of ‘new’ policing 
initiatives and describe where CR fits in the evolution and development of policing in 
Canada. Discussion will include the difficulties in transitioning from traditional policing, 
to community policing, to intelligence-led policing, to CR, which has been defined as a 
marriage of all past policing strategies. This will assist readers in understanding where 
CR activities fit in the spectrum of police crime prevention strategies. Chapter Two 
provides a chronology of the Coquitlam Detachment’s transition to a CR Detachment 
between 2005 and 2007. Chapter Three will describe the methodology and results of the 
survey I conducted, while Chapter Four will conclude by offering a discussion and 
analysis of the survey results, as well as recommendations to improve and inform the 
national implementation of CR. 
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Chapter One: Literature Review 
The transition from traditional policing to community policing to intelligence-led 
policing has not been without its challenges. Several issues impeded the full 
implementation of the community policing philosophy. Concerns over definition, slow 
organizational change, the difficulty in gaining buy-in from middle management, and the 
role of the community are cited as barriers to full implementation of community policing 
(Seagrave, 1995; Gibson, 2000; Deukmedjien, 2006). Further, community policing did 
not create the required relationship with the public to gather the type of intelligence 
needed to respond to the growing crime problem. The idea of intelligence-led policing 
soon entered the language of policing in an attempt to close this gap, but still suffered 
barriers to full implementation and institutionalization.   
This chapter provides an overview of the challenges to the full adoption of 
previous policing philosophies. There is a great deal of literature and research on this 
topic, and some would argue that these attempted initiatives and implementations have 
failed (Seagrave, 1994; Deukmedjien, 2006; Ratcliffe 2008; Townsley, Johnson, and 
Pease, 2003). This chapter will describe the obstacles experienced through past policing 
strategies and review the history of these change attempts, with a focus on how police 
officers felt about and were affected by these implementations. The content originates in 
Canada, the United-States, and the United Kingdom with an emphasis on the Canadian 
context and, in particular, the attempts at organizational change within the RCMP. The 
information is organized by describing individual, tactical, and strategic changes. This 
literature review will conclude with an explanation of where police CR activities fit in the 
spectrum and evolution of police strategies. 
  11
In order for an organization to fully assimilate a new initiative, such as 
community policing or intelligence-led policing, there must be full acceptance of the 
initiative’s tenets at an individual, tactical, and strategic level. On the individual level, 
every police officer must understand, and personally act upon, the principles of the 
initiative. On the tactical level, all police officers, especially those in middle 
management, must understand how to implement the new initiative. They must know 
how to allocate and train their personnel resources in ways that enshrine and promote the 
goals of the new initiative, and they must be capable of motivating all personnel under 
their command to further these common goals. At the strategic level, an overriding 
philosophy must be outlined, understood, and appreciated by all officers within the 
policing organization. This is the task of senior leadership. The following is how the 
RCMP failed to manifest true change in their attempt to first become a community 
policing organization, and then to become an intelligence-led organization. 
 
The Strategic Attempt at Implementing Community Policing 
For the last forty years, there has been a transition from the traditional role of 
police to what is now considered to be the current overall model of policing; the 
philosophy of community policing. Traditional policing emphasized rapid, reactive 
response to crime events. Traditional police detachment organizational structure was 
based on a command and control hierarchical structure in which police officers respond 
to crime after the fact. Community policing, on the other hand, can be seen as a 
responsibilisation process in which citizens, communities, property owners, city planners, 
and transportation managers play a more active role in fighting crime. Community 
  12
policing espoused the strengthening of police and public partnerships and saw crime 
prevention initiatives, such as Blockwatch, Crime Watch, Speed Watch, and various 
situational crime control initiatives, such as Crime Prevention through Environmental 
Design, Crime-Free Multi-Housing, target hardening, as well as the general proliferation 
of community police stations.  
Widespread interest in community policing in international policing circles began 
in the late 1980s. In Canada, the impetus began in 1989, when the Solicitor General 
published the discussion paper entitled “Police Challenge 2000” (Normandeau and 
Leighton, 1990).  This text outlined the guiding principles of community policing in 
Canada. The RCMP organizational change towards community policing also began in 
1989 when then Commissioner Inkster stated that the RCMP would adopt community 
policing as a service delivery philosophy. Over the following five years, many strategies 
were put into place to institutionalize community policing. These included the 
establishment of Community Contract and Aboriginal Policing Directorate (CCAP), and 
the development and wide posting of community policing mission statements. In 1995, 
the cadets training program at Depot began emphasizing training on community policing 
and the CAPRA8 problem solving model became the decision making model of choice 
for the National police force (Gibson, 2000).  
 
The Problem of Definition  
 Academics and writers in the field of criminology have found the task of defining 
community policing elusive, and various meanings have been articulated (Manning 1984; 
                                                 
8 CAPRA (Clients, Acquire and Analyze, Partnerships, Response, Assessment). 
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Murphy and Muir 1985; Normandeau and Leighton 1990; Ross, 1995; Trojanowicz; 
1990). The terms rhetoric, philosophy, process, ideology, paradigm, and program are 
used in many definitions, yet these words have differing meanings. An early critic 
defined the term ‘community policing’ as “… used to describe virtually any policing 
activity which its proponents approve” (Seagrave, 1997:207). Goldstein commented that, 
“… in many quarters today, ‘community policing’ is used to encompass practically all 
innovation in policing, from the most ambitious to the most mundane, from the most 
carefully thought through, to the most casual”(Goldstein, 1994: vii). This inability to 
design a simple, useable definition can easily cause anxiety and disillusionment amongst 
police officers. Since the late 1980s, police leaders in Canada, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom have used the word ‘philosophy’ to describe their interest in community 
policing. However, the way this concept applied to the day-to-day activities of police 
officers on the street was vague and difficult to identify and understand, let alone 
implement. Throughout the past twenty years, research has shown that police officers 
tended to be resistant to change and have expressed a desire to know exactly what it was 
they should do in their day-to-day work activities in order to realize ‘community 
policing’ (Goldstein, 1994; Lurigio and Skogan, 1994; Gaines, 1994; Seagrave, 1995; 
Lumb and Breazeale, 2002; Williams, 2003; Garcia, 2005; Chappell, 2007). 
 
Strategic Shift to Community Policing 
In 1987, Goldstein predicted that “… unless extraordinary measures are taken, 
officers assigned to perform community policing are likely to be ostracized and isolated 
in an organization with a heavily traditional orientation to reactive policing. They will not 
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be viewed by the vast majority of officers as performing “‘real’ police work” (Goldstein, 
1987: 11).  In 1998, another commentator wrote that: “… a growing body of research 
suggests that without proper implementation community policing and problem-oriented 
policing are empty concepts, raising public and police expectations” (Greene, 1998: 142). 
He pointed out that nearly every study on the matter concluded that the structure and 
culture of police organizations were the largest impediments to implementing 
community-based policing (Greene, 1998). Policing organizations have been 
unsuccessful at integrating the concept of community policing within most agencies.  
As noted by Deukmedjian (2006), through the late 1990s, the RCMP faced 
challenges of effective internal communication, severe budgetary pressures, de-
centralization, and suffered resistance to empowerment by mid-management. 
Deukmedjian stated: “the lack of resolution and alignment took its toll on front-line 
morale and their support for community policing...” (Deukmedjian, 2006: 30). These 
greater organizational difficulties combined with the apparent lack of interest in 
community policing led Seagrave to conclude that “the community policing philosophy 
can and will only coexist with the traditional law enforcement philosophy for the 
foreseeable future and may lead to two operational cultures of policing” (1995: 422). This 
is precisely what has occurred within the RCMP in BC. The fact that community policing 
is a difficult concept to integrate into policing organizations is evidenced by the fact that, 
to this day, community policing is a separate unit or section in most RCMP detachments. 
The RCMP is a contract municipal police force, and a provincial police force in 
all provinces and territories with the exception or Quebec and Ontario. The RCMP is also 
mandated to enforce the federal laws of Canada and is the country’s only national police 
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force. Municipally and provincially, the RCMP has made strides in implementing 
community policing. Yet, this philosophy was more elusive and difficult to assimilate at 
the level of federal policing. Here, community policing ideals, such as community 
engagement and community problem solving, were largely ignored because of the 
problem of defining the ‘community’ that federal enforcement branches were to engage. 
Due to the less than desired level of implementation, community policing did not succeed 
in increasing information uptake from communities in the area of intelligence gathering 
on organised crime and criminals, as was hoped (Deukmedjien, 2007). 
The challenges in implementing community policing led to disillusionment. As 
will be discussed further later in this chapter, the RCMP shifted its strategic priorities 
away from community social problems to organized crime in 2000. This marked the shift 
from community policing to intelligence-led policing. 
 
Tactical Shift to Community Policing 
As early as the 1980s, academics argued that community policing would only 
work if the rank-and-file police officers bought into the concepts (Goldstein, 1987). The 
notion that commitment to organizational change is inversely related to rank is well 
documented in the literature over the last twenty years (Gibson, 2000; Lugirio and 
Rosenbaum, 1994; Vito et al., 2005). Middle managers are the bridge between the 
philosophical ideals of police leaders and the police officers on the street; they “translate 
the executive vision and direction into operational strategies”(Vito et al., 2005: 493). The 
tactical role of middle managers, or non-commissioned officers, is to transform the 
wishes of the police chief into action through training, delegation, and motivation. Much 
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of the early research in community policing in the US demonstrates that street officers, as 
well as middle management, were ambivalent, if not overtly resistant and sceptical of the 
change from traditional policing to community policing (Lurigio and Skogan, 1994; 
Lugirio and Rosenbaum, 1994; Gaines, 1994; Goldstein, 1990; Greene, Bergman, and 
McLaughlin, 1994; Skogan, 1994). The RCMP has long known of the crucial role of 
middle management and frontline supervisors. This is evidenced in numerous policy 
documents that emphasized lessons learned throughout RCMP organizational change 
eras: Community Policing; Project Renewal; Mission, Vision, and Values; 
Regionalization; and Alignment. These policy documents consistently pointed to the 
important role of non-commissioned ranks (Gibson, 2000). As one RCMP officer stated 
“It’s the first line supervisor who will make or break the organization. The corporals are 
the ‘pace cars’ of the organization” (Gibson, 2000: 39). 
Recent research on the acceptance of community policing indicated that the high 
level of resistance from rank-and-file police officers has, to some extent, been overcome. 
The area of research that related to training clearly demonstrated that street officers who 
were well trained in community policing held much more positive attitudes about their 
jobs than officers who did not feel well trained (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1994; 
Skogan and Hartnett, 1997; Chappell, 2007). Research conducted in many American 
cities indicated that the level of police officer job satisfaction increased with the level of 
engagement in community policing. For example, in Adams, Rohe, and Arcury’s 2002 
study, community policing officers were more accepting of alternative policing strategies, 
more positive about their effect on crime, and more supportive of community policing in 
general than traditional officers were. Brody, DeMarco, and Lovrich’s (2002) study of 
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867 police personnel in Washington State found that respondents from departments with 
a higher level of community policing implementation reported higher levels of job 
satisfaction. One important note was made in the above study; the results indicated that 
job satisfaction was even lower in agencies where the implementation was half-hearted 
compared to those who did not implement community policing at all. This serves as a 
warning to would-be police change agents. If an agency executive attempts to implement 
a new policing strategy in only a small portion or unit of their department, or only 
partially implements a broad strategy in the form of an isolated project, they may actually 
reduce job satisfaction (Brody, DeMarco, and Lovrich’s, 2002). This may lead to 
alienation and resentment among personnel who are not included or involved in the 
adoption of the new strategies.9 Scholars affirmed that it was important to examine the 
attitudes and views of staff before implementing new policing initiatives in order to 
identify “pockets of resistance” as this can “… assist the administration to shape program 
operations to be more palatable to line staff and their supervisors” (Lurigio and Skogan, 
1994: 329). As one middle manager in a 2005 study aptly noted:  
Community policing officers have been empowered by their immediate 
supervisors to “be their own bosses,” and patrol supervisors are unable to use 
them as a resource to answer calls that are holding. As a result, they are alienated 
from the other officers because they rarely handle any calls for service and thus 
add to the patrol officers’ workload. Community policing must become a 
department-wide philosophy practiced by all of our personnel, not just a few in 
specialized units. There are conflicts between beat officers and community 
policing officers. They wear a special uniform and are not subject to calls for 
service. Community policing officers have been involved in activities which have 
questionable benefit or which do not promote the image and respect we strive for. 
(Vito et al., 2005: 502). 
 
 
                                                 
9 This perspective was also articulated very early on in the implementation of community policing by 
Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990). 
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Despite the evidence that community policing increased job satisfaction for community 
policing officers, several studies pointed to a split between community policing officers 
and traditional officers (Garcia, 2005; Lurigio and Skogan, 1994; Seagrave, 1995). For 
example, Garcia (2005) examined how police culture stigmatized and sanctioned 
community policing officers because they engaged in ‘social work’ unlike the ‘normal’ or 
‘good cop.’ Garcia noted that the “normal, or good cop, is the officer who engages in 
acceptable police functions or who at least attempts to engage in these functions. The 
function defined as ‘real’ police work is crime fighting.” (Garcia, 2005: 68). Garcia 
further stated that community policing officers were seen as ‘other’. These concerns 
continued to be echoed in ongoing discussions about the respective role of the police and 
the community in community policing (Deukmedjien, 2006; Ratcliffe, 2008; Seagrave, 
1995). 
Individual Shift to Community Policing 
 In 1994, Seagrave wrote extensively about the adoption of community policing in 
British Columbia. Seagrave assessed the extent of organizational change from traditional 
policing practices to community policing in British Columbia by conducting in depth 
interviews with municipal and RCMP police leaders, conducting surveys of police 
officers throughout BC, and providing a brief analysis of police policy reports. Her 
findings showed that: 
….organizational change is evident in the content of federal and provincial policy 
documents of the larger police agencies. To a somewhat more limited extent 
organizational change is cautiously endorsed by police leaders, while police 
officers expressed the most concern. (Seagrave, 1995, preface)  
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Seagrave explained that the term ‘community policing’ was considered a meaningless, 
rhetorical term by many police officers. For instance, RCMP officers often claimed to not 
know what ‘community policing’ was despite the fact that endorsements of community 
policing were contained within the mission statement of the RCMP displayed in the 
reception areas of all RCMP detachments (Seagrave, 1995). In 1992, then RCMP 
Commissioner Norm Inkster stated that “… the essence of community based policing still 
eludes some of us and many of our efforts do not yield results because we have not 
properly understood the concept we are trying to apply” (Inkster, 1992: 28). Leading 
police management experts agree that ultimate success of any organizational change 
effort depends on how well the organization can alter the behaviour patterns of its 
employees (Williams, 2003). The question was did community policing actually alter 
what first responder police officers did on an hourly or daily basis? 
In the early years of community policing in BC, Seagrave concluded that only 
47% of RCMP police officers supported the movement toward community policing, 
compared to 63% of police officers of independent agencies (Seagrave, 1995). It 
appeared that individual officers were not convinced of the usefulness of community 
policing. With acceptance at only 50%, police officers in BC continued to carry out 
police work in the traditional way. As illustrated by a police officer’s lament: “Spend 
more time with contributing, non-offending segments of society to improve their poor 
perceptions of police. This will then decrease crime?” (Seagrave, 1995: 337). Immediacy 
remained at the forefront as police officers continued to go from call to call with little 
will and little time for direct engagement with the broader community they serve.  
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The RCMP responded to this lack of interest in community policing by 
transforming the way it trained police officers. The new training program shifted the 
emphasis from enforcement to problem solving. New RCMP recruits were trained to use 
the CAPRA (Clients, Acquire and Analyze, Partnerships, Response, Assessment) 
problem solving model from 1995 onward. The model was designed to assist police 
officers in both dealing with general calls for service and in addressing community 
concerns.  
Officers who are assigned to general units tasked with response to calls often say 
that they have difficulty in balancing problem solving with answering calls and 
investigating crimes (Cordner and Biebel, 2005). According to Scott (2000), “line-level 
officers lack the requisite resources in most instances to conduct the sort of analysis and 
effect the sort of responses necessary to bring about substantial improvements in 
community wide problems” (Scott, 2000: 13). It is clear that police officers who attend a 
call of a youth drinking and damaging school property will have no difficulty in listing 
off their clients and potential partners; they will contact parents, schools, and youth 
workers and come to an agreeable response to the incident. But, what to do about the call 
for service involving a chronically homeless person or a drug addicted panhandler? What 
can an individual police officer do about broader, more entrenched community problems? 
As Gowri (2003) stated, “Officers who do problem solving are being asked to take on the 
roles of social worker, youth mentor, re-distributor of resources, and many others. But, 
police officers are neither best suited to adopt these various roles, nor are they adequately 
trained for them” (Gowri, 2003: 605). Is it reasonable to expect an individual police 
officer to solve complex community problems like homelessness and drug addiction in 
  21
the middle of a shift when he or she is required to carry out dozens of other immediate 
tasks? A patrol officer’s shift is organized around responding from one call to the next. It 
seems unreasonable to expect a busy general duty member to solve community problems 
in between the domestic assault files and robberies.  
The move towards problem solving policing was an attempt to engage police 
officers in community policing; however, what was not considered in this model was that 
as the level of complexity of a problem increases, the level of expertise required to solve 
it increases. An individual police officer cannot resolve many of the chronic problems 
faced by communities. They cannot redress many of the underlying causes of crime, such 
as homelessness and drug addiction. CAPRA does assist police officers in identifying the 
partners that need to be engaged to address these issues, but they alone do not have the 
capacity to effect change on issues that must be addressed at the community level. Most 
of the senior management within the RCMP went through training 25 or more years ago 
when the training of police officers emphasized the physical duties of policing and an 
enforcement model of problem solving. These police leaders were not initially trained on 
CAPRA and may not always be aware of their capacity to engage partners on a higher 
problem solving level.10 In order to address the underlying causes of crime, police 
leadership must practice CAPRA themselves. 
 The transition to crime prevention and community policing has varied widely in 
its level of implementation and institutionalisation. Some RCMP detachments have 
higher levels of acceptance of community policing, while others have one token 
                                                 
10 From my experience in policing, I believe that constable level police officers are highly aware of this and 
they do feel the pressure to help solve community problems. However, they are unable to do so as they are 
busy going from call to call. The energy and willingness to improve the well-being of communities is 
slowly frustrated. It would sometimes seem that what is widely understood by CAPRA generation police 
officers has yet to be taken up by more senior leaders who are in a better position to act. 
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community policing/crime prevention constable working in a small office or community 
policing station. This member is often relegated to this task due to injury or illness as 
‘community policing’ posts are generally seen in police subculture as relatively 
uninteresting.11 This may have occurred because community policing was seen by mid-
level management as a “flavour of the month” public relations endeavour. As noted by 
Vito, Walsh, and Kunselman (2005), middle managers feel that they are caught in the 
middle of this change in policing. However, these authors noted that: 
 
…many of them (middle managers) fail to take ownership for the role they must 
play in the implementation process. It is not just the chief executives' direction 
and responsibility to make community policing an organizational reality. 
Organizationally, it is the middle manager that has the responsibility to 
operationalize the goals and objectives of the chief executive. If their concerns 
and expressed belief in the potential of community policing is not translated into 
action aimed at correcting the identified problems, nothing will happen. 
Community policing is then doomed to be what it is in most police departments 
today - a special unit program. Their frank responses, however, do provide  
valuable information concerning the value and purpose of this sea change reform. 
(Vito et al., 2005: 508) 
 
These middle managers were reluctant to let go of the traditional way of doing business, 
and the problem solving potential of community policing was not emphasised. Instead, 
community police units and community police positions were created. These officers 
were primarily involved in crime prevention initiatives, such as Block Watch, and the 
management of civilian volunteer groups, like Citizens on Patrol, Speed Watch, and 
Victim Services. I would suggest, however, that the community policing strategic vision 
held by senior RCMP executives was not realised because the initiative’s principles are at 
odds with incident response policing. The implementation did not succeed because the 
                                                 
11 This is based both on my research of this topic as well as my personal experience in policing: of which 
policing section jobs are, or not, sought after, and are, or not, considered by police officers as exclusive or 
highly valued. 
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frontlines did not get the clear direction or improved capacity necessary to practice 
community policing while on duty. The idea that both reactive and proactive policing 
could co-exist was not adequately articulated. This led to a less than desirable level of 
tactical and individual institutionalisation. This would later lead to a gradual loss of 
interest in anything community policing. Community policing ceased being a philosophy 
and became a separate type of policing. Nothing exemplifies the process of distancing the 
activities of crime prevention and community policing from every day policing better 
than the fact that there is a separate section or unit for these activities at the national, 
provincial, and detachment levels within the RCMP. This segregation has only of late 
been identified as a problem within the “E” Division Community Policing Section. The 
Community Policing Section, a RCMP Pacific region policy and support section, was 
established in the 1990s. Recently, a change in leadership has led to the recognition that 
the RCMP had created a barrier to the full acceptance of community policing by creating 
these organizational separations. The Community Policing Section of the BC RCMP has 
recently been re-named ‘Crime Prevention and Support Services’. This title better reflects 
the true nature of the section and allows all police officers the freedom to conduct 
‘community policing’ activities. 
To date, research on the effectiveness of community policing as a policing service 
delivery model is scant. There is a general lack of convincing evidence demonstrating the 
value of community policing (Goldstein, 1979, 1990; Skogan, 1996; Sherman 1996). 
Various research findings concluded by stating that affirming that community policing 
works was difficult due to the lack of consistent goals and outcome measures and general 
lack of conclusive evaluative research (Seagrave, 1997); that the levels of serious crime 
  24
did not appear to be linked to proactive community policing measures (Trojanowicz and 
Bucqueroux, 1990; MacDonald, 2002); and that community policing did not appear to 
directly reduce fear of crime (Scheider et al., 2003). Overall, conclusive research 
confirming that community policing reduces crime and fear of crime does not exist.  
 
Strategic Shift to Intelligence-led Policing 
Ratcliffe explained that intelligence-led policing was adopted in the UK and 
Canada in the late 1990s due to “… changes such as globalization, the perceived growth 
in organized crime, and an increase in the ability of police to employ information 
technology systems for information management”(Ratcliffe, 2005: 436). Intelligence-led 
policing is to some extent easier to define and even quantify than community policing. A 
successful intelligence-led policing is one that is “… able to interpret the criminal 
environment, convey that intelligence to decision-makers, and influence their thinking so 
that decision-makers in turn design creative CR policies that have an impact on the 
criminal environment” (Ratcliffe, 2005: 440). Some academics argued that intelligence-
led policing was thought to be just the latest rhetorical fad which would not change 
policing at the front-line (Gill, 2000). Just as community policing, this new approach to 
policing would meet many organizational obstacles to its adoption. Intelligence-led 
policing, much like its predecessor, failed to be institutionalized at the personal, tactical, 
and strategic level. 
By the late 1990s, concern was expressed about the low level of community 
policing implementation achieved. By the late 1990s, this disillusionment was made 
evident by many police leaders, including Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli, the then 
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Commissioner of the RCMP. Having seen that community policing was not 
accomplishing the level of intelligence uptake required to combat crime in a world where 
organized crime and terrorism were increasingly global in nature, Commissioner 
Zaccardelli announced that the RCMP would become an intelligence-led policing agency. 
In December 2000, the Commissioner's Office issued the “Directional Statement for 
2001/2002”. The new mandate stated that “… being an intelligence-led organization 
means we will work together internationally, and with our partners at home and abroad, 
to ensure that we utilize the best information in making decisions, taking action and 
assessing the results”.12  This allowed police leaders to continue to work in partnership 
with other agencies, but absent in this directional statement was the term ‘community.’ 
Organized crime became the strategic priority of the force and it was “the most serious 
crime treat to Canada’s institutions, society, economics, and quality of life”.13 In this 
statement, the RCMP shifted its mission from community policing to intelligence-led 
policing.   
Dr. Allan Castle, civilian member and Officer in Charge of the Criminal Analysis 
Section within the Criminal Intelligence Section of RCMP “E” Division, stated that “… it 
must be admitted that implementation (of intelligence programs) is at times erratic and 
still noticeably incomplete” (Castle, 2007: 3). He explained that: 
Since the late 1990s, police agencies in Canada have individually and collectively 
attempted to place themselves on an intelligence-led operational footing. This has 
taken several forms. Municipal police, provincial police forces, and the RCMP 
have all invested in expanded intelligence capacity and training. Collaborative 
                                                 
12 Commissioner’s Office, Directional Statement 2001/2002. Ottawa: Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 
Found in: Deukmedjien, J. E.. From Community to Intelligence: Executive Realignment of RCMP Mission. 
Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 48(4), 2006, p531. 
13 Commissioner’s Office, Directional Statement 2001/2002. Ottawa: Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 
Found in: Deukmedjien, J. E.. From Community to Intelligence: Executive Realignment of RCMP Mission. 
Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 48(4), 2006, p531. 
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intelligence processes, including a number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives, 
but above all efforts to establish an integrated national threat assessment on 
organized crime supported by a common methodology assessing organized crime 
across 19 separate criteria (“SLEIPNIR”; RCMP 2000), have brought the 
intelligence holdings of a growing majority of police agencies into a shared and 
commonly analyzed setting (Castle, 2007: 7). 
 
The RCMP has, to a great extent, increased its capacity to engage in intelligence-led 
policing since 2000. There has been an increase in analytical capability within both 
provincial and federal enforcement units, such as criminal intelligence and drug and 
organized crime units. Castle asserted that “… new collaborative field techniques have 
brought operational intelligence more closely in line with the needs of substantive 
enforcement units” (Castle, 2007: 7). Nevertheless, this capacity is limited to 
enforcement units outside municipal or detachment level policing. In my assessment, 
intelligence-led policing was largely taken up at the federal level of policing, and 
detachment level policing has seen little organizational change since the 2000 declaration 
by Commissioner Zaccardelli. 
 
 
Tactical Shift to Intelligence-led Policing 
As discussed earlier, from a tactical level, middle managers and training are 
important. However, Deukmedjien noted that “… just as they (UK policing community) 
failed to do with community policing, police officers neither understand nor appreciate 
the new expectations in absence of intelligence-led training and management 
exercises”(Deukmedjien, 2006: 533). The RCMP do no better. With the exception of a 
human source handling on-line course (which mainly describes policy and procedures in 
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documenting information from informant sources), training on intelligence-led policing 
for frontline police officers does not exist. Middle managers are generally not engaged in 
encouraging their personnel to develop intelligence sources because the process of 
documenting this process is seen as cumbersome and complicated. In this regard, RCMP 
officers are missing opportunities to increase intelligence uptake.  
In order for police frontline practices to be truly intelligence-led, information 
must be collected, collated, and analyzed. This is the work of the crime analysts. Unlike 
what occurs in other western nations, criminal analysis lacks capacity in Canada. 
Although the number of crime analysts working in support of RCMP detachments is 
increasing, only 10% of RCMP detachments in BC have secured the services of a 
dedicated crime analyst.14 Since 2000, there has been an increase in interest in building 
analytical capacity within the RCMP. Castle noted that “… although there is no recent 
data on HR growth in the intelligence analysis field, the capacity of policing in this area 
has probably tripled since 2000 based on the writer’s observations” (Castle, 2007: 7). It 
must be noted that although work is being done to address it, standardized training for 
crime analysts is also deficient. There is little, if any, post-secondary training in criminal 
analysis in Canada.15 Crime analysts are hired based on their past experience in working 
within a policing organization, but their computer skills and training in the field of crime 
analysis, in particular, is not a job requirement. With regards to RCMP investment into 
technological capacity for intelligence-led policing, Castle stated that “… significant 
(although probably insufficient) investment has been made into contemporary 
                                                 
14 Of the approximate 130 RCMP detachments in BC, only a dozen detachments have crime analysts in 
place. 
15 With the exception of the British Columbia Institute of Technology’s (BCIT) Bachelor of Technology in 
Forensic Investigation, which has Crime and Criminal Analysis option, there are no post secondary degree 
or diploma programs specific to Crime Analysis in Canada. 
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IT/database support for the retention, analysis, and sharing of police information and 
intelligence” (Castle, 2007:  7). There is clearly more to be done to implement 
intelligence-led policing at the tactical level. 
 
Individual Shift to Intelligence-led Policing 
At the individual level, intelligence-led policing requires rank-and-file police 
officers to develop informants and elicit information from these sources (Maguire, 2000). 
As noted earlier, the training required to accomplish this is lacking in the RCMP. 
However, research into the level of acceptance of analyst input within detachments can 
easily be seen as an even greater obstacle to overcome. Police officers often remain 
sceptical, and even suspicious, of crime analysts. The literature on the topic of the 
acceptance of analysts within police organizations often blames police culture as an 
obstacle to the integration of analysts into policing operations. Criminologist Nina Cope 
noted that “… it needs to be acknowledged that within a culture that is not used to 
routinely relying on evaluated, evidence-based approaches to tackling crime, that analysis 
(however well developed the products may be) has considerable obstacles to overcome” 
(Cope, 2004: 196). She stated that a frequent complaint of analysts was that police 
officers did not action the work produced by analysts, and further, that police fear that 
analysts encroached on the role of police as ‘experts’ in crime matters. The analysis 
driven tasking process often replaced the street level judgment around prioritizing 
problems. This process resulted in “potentially reinforcing the tension between 
management command of events and street level officers’ discretion” (Cope, 2004: 197). 
Other academics have pointed to difficulties in the relationship between police officers 
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and analysts. As noted by Taylor, Kowalyk, and Boba, “the general level of interaction 
between analysts and frontline patrol seems to be limited at best and one sided (i.e., 
analysts seek to understand officers, but the reverse does not happen often)” (2007: 165). 
In Canada, the tension between the role of the analyst and that of police officers is 
exemplified by the simple fact that analysts work in offices that are separate from the 
work areas of the police they assist, and are often not physically located in an area that 
encourages communication and co-operation.   
Cope would later reinforce the assertions made by Gill in 2000. After underlining 
the crucial role of analysts in interpreting information and transforming it into 
operationally useful intelligence, she noted that her research “… highlighted the chasm 
between the theory and practice of intelligence led policing and the current role of 
analysts” (Cope, 2004: 201). With regards to the goal of achieving full integration of 
civilian crime analysts within an often ego-driven police culture, Cope commented that 
“… without a detailed understanding of their mutual roles, processes, epistemologies and 
expertise, the hope of developing a productive relationship seems unachievable” (Cope, 
2004: 201). In 2004, then RCMP Commissioner Zaccardelli conceded that: 
…we have a lot of information available to us, coming in many forms and 
intensified through technology. But information in its raw form can be confusing, 
contradictory, and overwhelming. A conscious process needs to be employed to 
transform information into intelligence. Our challenge is to create the capacity – 
to gather, analyze, prioritize, and use information strategically, for the purpose of 
achieving our mission. (Zaccardelli, 2004)  
 
It appears that the RCMP continues to experience a challenging capacity and acceptance 
gap with regards to the full implementation of intelligence-led policing.  Further, the 
outcomes of this enforcement strategy remain difficult to measure. Castle concluded that 
enforcement action towards organized crime was not known to have a measured impact. 
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He stated that “…our efforts tell us much about our known target base without getting us 
very far towards knowing if our efforts matter much to the communities we police in 
tangible terms” (Castle, 2007: 18). Further, and most of interest within the context of the 
present discussion, there is little to indicate that intelligence-led policing has become a 
service delivery model within the realm of RCMP contract policing. Intelligence-led 
policing has not had an impact on Canadian police practices to the extent that the 
philosophy has altered the practices at detachment level policing, nor has it significantly 
affected the frontlines of policing in the RCMP.  
To summarize, the RCMP continues to rely mainly on response to calls for 
service as a guiding service delivery model. It appears that the RCMP has been 
unsuccessful in fully transitioning from traditional policing to either community policing 
or intelligence-led policing. This is because the RCMP has not been able to, either at an 
organizational or detachment level, harness the will of its personnel at the personal, 
tactical, and strategic level. Ratcliffe explained that “… many in law enforcement seem 
to assume that they know what intelligence-led policing entails, often resulting in the 
same policing style as before, operated as business as usual but under a new name” 
(Ratcliffe, 2005: 436). His fear that intelligence-led policing may suffer a fate similar to 
community policing is shared by this researcher.  
 
Crime Reduction as a Hybrid Model of Policing  
In conducting this research, resounding similarities were noted among past 
paradigms of policing (traditional, community, and intelligence-led policing) in terms of 
their ‘failed’ institutionalisation. It was observed that many elements of CR were taken 
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from concepts which were fundamental to these earlier approaches. For instance, CR 
advocates a renewed enthusiasm for traditional enforcement action, though, according to 
CR, the resources for such action should follow risk (high volume property crime 
offenders, high crime areas). Further, in CR, enforcement action should be open to 
alternatives to incarceration and should support other meaningful sentencing options. 
With regards to a comparison with community policing, some of the goals of CR are 
similar to those for community policing: reduce crime; reduce fear of crime; and reduce 
anti-social behavior (RCMP, Quarterly Communiqué, June, 2006). CR advocates the 
benefits of having a problem solving and intelligence-led approach by emphasizing that 
all policing strategies should be based on evidence. CR initiatives must have measurable 
outputs, and this evaluation component is creating interest among members. CR moves 
beyond rhetoric and into action by asking police officers to look specifically at hot spots, 
crime causation, and prolific offenders. This translates into simple, easy to understand 
goals for police agencies. CR, to some extent, is a return to traditional policing because 
targeting prolific offenders means, in essence, catching bad guys. While community 
policing broadens the role of the police in society, CR narrows the list of tasks that 
general duty police officers need to perform. 
Community policing was not realised because the initiative’s principles were at 
odds with incident response policing at a detachment level. On the other hand, the level 
of capacity required to engage in intelligence-led policing beyond the federal 
enforcement level had not yet grown to allow detachments to conduct their operations in 
a fashion that really incorporated intelligence analysis.16 There is a desire to rectify these 
                                                 
16  I have personally heard many police leaders express that the resources necessary to do either community 
policing or intelligence-led policing well do not exist.  
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challenges as the RCMP begins to implement CR initiatives.17 Much effort has been 
made at a detachment and divisional level to ensure that police officers at all levels have 
the tools they need to engage in CR. Due to its simultaneous emphasis on analysis-led 
enforcement towards prolific offenders and crime hot spots, and its emphasis on 
integrated justice and partnership building with outside agencies, CR allows reactive and 
proactive policing to co-exist, and can be applied at the federal, provincial, and 
detachment level of policing. This will be further discussed in the next chapter.  
Brantingham categorised crime prevention into three levels.18 He describes the 
varying levels of crime prevention as primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. The move 
from level one to level three of police crime prevention illustrates how the continuum of 
strategies move from prevention focused on crime events (primary), at-risk crime 
situations and places (secondary), to interventions in criminality itself (tertiary). 
Brantingham describes the primary level of police crime prevention as activities or 
programs aimed at preventing crime through identifying “conditions in the social and 
physical environment that facilitate the development of criminality or provide 
opportunities for or precipitate criminal events” (Brantingham, 2008). The secondary 
level of police crime prevention attempts to prevent crime through identifying “specific 
at-risk situations and places, groups, and individuals before they develop persistent crime 
problems or engage in criminal activity” (Brantingham, 2008). The tertiary level of police 
                                                 
17 This is evidenced by the extensive internal communication from Deputy Commissioner Gary Bass, 
Crime Reduction Newsletters, and “E” Division: The Year in Review British Columbia documents of 2005 
to 2007.  
18 Dr Paul Brantingham. Presentation entitled Fundamentals of Crime Prevention. British Columbia Crime 
Prevention Association Conference, October 3rd, 2008. 
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crime prevention attempts to prevent crime through an emphasis on an offender’s 
criminality. As noted by Brantingham, the tertiary level of crime prevention:  
…deals with places that have established crime problems and with actual 
offenders. It provides interventions aimed at changing the physical site 
and social situations found at crime generators, crime attractors and other 
crime hot spots in ways that minimize the criminal opportunities found at 
them. It provides interventions aimed at incapacitating, reforming and 
rehabilitating actual offenders so that they commit no further offences 
(Brantingham, 2008).  
 
This shift from crime prevention through action against crime events to prevention 
through action against offender encapsulates the transition from reactive response to calls 
for service undertaken in the traditional model of policing, to targeted strategies aimed at 
particular offenders in the new CR model. Such a shift is required in a global political 
and economic reality in which police are decreasingly able to respond effectively to 
crime incidences. Resources must follow risk and strategies that augment the police’s 
abilities to uptake civilian information about the criminal environment must be sought. 
This information can then be analyzed and shaped into intelligence that can be used in 
police enforcement against individual criminals or criminal organizations.  
CR is a practical approach to accomplishing the goals of the three former 
philosophies because it can easily be adopted within a detachment. CR can be defined as 
“The marriage of (1) community-policing and crime prevention; (2) problem-oriented 
policing; (3) intelligence-led policing; and (4) the emerging field of evidence-based 
policing.”(RCMP. “E” Division Crime Reduction Strategy Strategic Communications 
Plan 2005: 7). From a detachment level operational standpoint, CR can be seen as a way 
of operationalizing community policing, problem solving, and intelligence-led policing. 
Through the transition from the traditional model of policing to the development of 
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community policing and intelligence-led policing, the emphasis in policing has remained 
on the crime and not the criminal. CR does one thing that is very unique from all past 
philosophies; CR implies a shift in focus from the offence to the offender. As noted 
earlier in this chapter, the structure and culture of police organizations are the largest 
impediments to implementing community-based policing. CR strategies attempt to bridge 
this gap by offering immediate and long term approaches to reducing crime by ensuring 
that resources follow risk. The next chapters of this paper will attempt to describe how 
one detachment has moved toward this new and improved paradigm of policing. 
CR, like previous paradigms in policing, is inherently challenged because it is a 
vague concept and difficult to define. There is some concern that police departments will 
rush to implement CR without adequate planning, training, or resources. Without proper 
grounding and employee acceptance, the move towards CR will likely experience the 
same marginalization seen previously with community policing: CR will be relegated to a 
separate unit within a detachment and proactive targeted enforcement action, as well as 
intelligence uptake opportunities, will be lost. Commitment to change and engagement in 
change are required at all levels of policing organizations. As Lumb and Breazeale 
insisted, “… initial supervision, coaching, and training must focus on obtaining buy-in 
and commitment to the new program before addressing the “how to” process of 
implementation” (Lumb and Breazeale, 2002: 103). It could be argued that this initial 
buy-in building phase did not occur to the extent that was required to fully institutionalize 
community policing and intelligence-led policing. This is the lesson that must be 
understood as police leaders undertake to implement CR initiatives.  
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Chapter Two: The Coquitlam RCMP Crime Reduction 
Implementation 
This chapter will focus on the steps undertaken in altering the Coquitlam RCMP 
Detachment’s operational and tactical procedures in an effort to integrate the tenets of CR 
initiatives. This implementation required a new focus on the following: crime hot spots; 
prolific offenders; crime causation; and increased accountability, partnerships, and 
evidence-led approaches.  
The Coquitlam Detachment polices the cities of Coquitlam and Port Coquitlam, as 
well as the townships of Anmore and Belcarra. These communities are located east of 
Vancouver, in southwest British Columbia. The total population of these four 
communities is approximately 178, 940.19 The number of RCMP officers serving these 
communities in 2008 was approximately 200, a number consistent with the number of 
police officers in a large RCMP detachment. 
 
Crime Reduction Implementation Timeline 
The Coquitlam RCMP Detachment started to become a CR Detachment in May 
2005 when the management team of the detachment attended an “E” Division senior 
management conference (POWPOM) at the Pacific Region Training Facility in 
Chilliwack, BC. The meetings were conducted by the “E” Division Operations Strategy 
Branch, and presentations included speakers from the United Kingdom and from 
Australia, as well as presentations from the Institute for Canadian Urban Research 
                                                 
19 This figure is based on the estimated population totals from the British Columbia Government website. 
Retrieved on 2008-12-03 from: 
http://www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca/DATA/pop/pop/mun/Mun2007a.asp 
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Studies (ICURS).20 The intention was to begin familiarizing the BC RCMP Detachment 
Commanders with CR principles. When the question of which detachment was interested 
in being a pilot detachment was posed, Superintendent Peter Lepine, Officer in Charge of 
the Coquitlam RCMP Detachment, quickly raised his hand. Coquitlam became a CR pilot 
site along with Maple Ridge, Port Moody, Penticton, Comox Valley, Port McNeill, and 
Fraser Lake. The first few months of the CR implementation in Coquitlam were 
unhurried. Information about the initiative to police officers on patrol was limited and 
vague. 
Figure 1 - Coquitlam Crime Reduction Strategy Implementation Timeline* 
May 2005 Coquitlam volunteers to be a CR Pilot Site 
May 2005 to 
August 2005 
First steps towards targeted enforcement against prolific offenders 
August 2005 Superintendent Peter Lepine invites his entire management team to attend 
a CR meeting at the Operations Strategy Branch. 
2005 Coquitlam CRU is comprised of 5 members mainly working as liaison in 
Community Policing Satellite Offices working on Repeat Calls for 
Service as well as various Problem Oriented Policing initiatives. 
Early 2006 The Coquitlam CRU is comprised of nine members. Shift of focus to 
Prolific and Priority Offenders. 
July 2006 A Crime Analyst is hired. 
July 2006 The Coquitlam Detachment hires its first CR Communications Strategist. 
February 2007 The CRU is at full strength, 18 members. 
* Timeline based on personal communication with Superintendent Peter Lepine. 
 
 Superintendent Lepine’s management style demonstrated an interest in working 
towards a common vision and towards consensus driven change management and 
accountability. Superintendent Lepine felt that the implementation of CR, unlike that of 
community policing in the 1990s, was going to be driven by local needs rather than using 
                                                 
20 The Institute for Canadian Urban Research Studies (ICURS) is an inter-disciplinary research centre based 
at Simon Fraser University. The Institute has as its focus increasing knowledge and research studies and the 
development of new analysis tools for the study of crime in an urban environment. 
http://www.sfu.ca/icurs/aboutUs.html 
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a cookie cutter approach to policing. He saw an opportunity to introduce a COMPSTAT 
style of management within the framework of a CR philosophy of focusing on crime hot 
spots, prolific offenders, and crime causation while incorporating the principles of 
ownership and accountability. He also felt that lessons learned in change management 
should be applied to this implementation.  
           Superintendent Lepine had only been with the Coquitlam detachment for a few 
weeks when the topic of CR was suggested to him and his team. His approach would be 
one of flexibility and he would take great care to build a shared vision by consensus. He 
would, therefore, be certain not to force his way through this implementation process. 
This hands-on, yet accessible and open-minded approach would persist throughout the 
implementation phases to come. Yet, Superintendent Lepine’s first challenge was to gain 
the buy-in of his management team. 
 From May 2005 to August 2005, the detachment took its first steps towards 
targeted enforcement against prolific offenders. Superintendent Lepine requested that his 
management team begin meeting weekly to discuss CR strategies, projects, and 
operational plans. A Crime Reduction Unit (CRU) was formed. This section’s task was to 
define, identify, and begin to proactively build a case against offenders who were 
particularly active in their detachment area. To fill the first positions within the CRU, the 
police officers serving in the Community Policing Unit simply shifted over to the new 
CRU unit. This required that these police officers work as a problem solving team rather 
than being individually tasked to various crime prevention related responsibilities at the 
four remote community policing stations. This shift in staffing represented a move away 
from the prevention side of community policing to a more enforcement focused team that 
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had as a primary goal the surveillance of prolific offenders. 
 In August 2005, the Operations Strategy Branch held a meeting to discuss how 
CR should work in pilot detachments. Representation included a few members of the 
management team and management from all pilot sites. Superintendent Lepine invited his 
entire management team to attend with him as he believed strongly that all stakeholders 
should understand what CR would mean to them. This consensus building exercise was 
emblematic of his management style. It is at this management meeting that 
Superintendent Lepine saw that the detachment had already adopted CR strategies and 
had demonstrated success in ways equal to or better than the other detachments. The 
Coquitlam Detachment management team came to see that they were on the right track in 
their CR efforts.  
 In December 2005 and early 2006, the Coquitlam CRU teamed up with the 
Integrated Provincial Auto Crime Team (IMPACT) to arrest several local prolific 
offenders. The team effort was successful, as expressed in the 2006 Annual Report on 
Public Safety, an inaugural report aimed at informing both the public and the police 
community about the local CR efforts;  
…because Coquitlam RCMP was able to provide specific information to guide 
the selection and placement of the bait car, the project resulted in the arrest of 
several of the offenders responsible for the increased activity in the area and a 
significant reduction in activity. (Coquitlam RCMP, 2006).21  
 
This early project was one of the first successes of CR strategies in Coquitlam as the 
information gathered by the CRU was entirely based on their study of both crime hot 
spots and prolific offenders. The initiative was viewed as a great success and bolstered 
                                                 
21 2006 RCMP Annual Report. The report was publicly distributed from the Coquitlam Detachment. Many 
other Coquitlam RCMP reports are available at the following website:  
http://www.city.port-coquitlam.bc.ca/City_Hall/City_Departments/Police_Services__RCMP_.htm  
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the detachment's interest in CR strategies. This concerted effort also provided the first 
opportunity to gain the support of local Crown prosecutors for this new targeted approach 
towards particularly persistent offenders. 
Organizational Change 
 In Coquitlam, becoming a CR detachment meant making the tenets of CR (crime 
causation, hot spots, and prolific offenders) central themes during any and all decisions 
regarding tactical operations and deployments. In order to accomplish this, the 
detachment organizational chart was modified. As depicted in the Figure 2, the CRU 
became the core detachment unit for day-to-day CR initiatives, such as surveillance of 
prolific offenders and enforcement or other problem solving methods to remove or 
disrupt hotspots. The intent of the organizational chart change was to demonstrate how 
information should flow in and out of the CRU unit. If the watch commanders and plain 
clothes investigation section commanders could visualize how intelligence information 
flowed back and forth between sections, they should, in theory, be in a better position to 
explain the importance of information sharing to their general duty police officers and 
plain clothes section members. The hope was that by making CRU (and the Crime 
Analyst) the central repository of this detachment intelligence information, better 
solutions would be found to deal with crime problems.  
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Figure 2 - Coquitlam Crime Reduction Organizational Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By early 2007, the CRU was at full strength, with18 police officers. Their 
mandate was to do proactive targeted enforcement action against known prolific 
offenders. Their techniques involved everything from surveillance, uniform enforcement 
of warrants and curfew checks, to liaising with mental health, housing services, 
addictions services, probation, and Crown. 
The Crime Reduction Unit (CRU) and Crime Analysis 
 In early 2006, the CRU expanded to nine police officers resulting in an increased 
ability to produce more complete prolific offender information packages to present to the 
local Crown prosecutor. These packages included details regarding the mental health and 
addiction condition of offenders being proactively targeted. The intent was to 
demonstrate to the court that actions taken with these offenders in the past had clearly not 
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been successful, and that their persistent criminal activity would continue to be a threat to 
public safety if an attempt was not made to achieve meaningful sentencing (i.e. a longer 
sentence or sentences that involve substance abuse treatment or mental health treatment). 
The Coquitlam Prolific Offender Management Program was well on its way when a 
Crime Analyst was hired to complement the team in July 2006.  
 The incorporation of a civilian member Crime Analyst as a key player in the 
crafting of CR strategies was not simple. According to recent research on the integration 
of crime analysts into law enforcement agencies, analysts indicated that, while 
management supported their work, they often did not feel that they got respect from 
front-line officers. Also, civilian members were said to have difficulty fitting into the 
often rough and tough world of police sub-culture (Taylor, Kowalyk, and Boba, 2007). 
 Luckily, the Coquitlam RCMP detachment benefited from acquiring a Crime 
Analyst who was already experienced in working in a police environment. Crime Analyst 
and Civilian Member (C/M) Andi Becket quickly got to work tracking detachment 
performance and overall CR effects. Becket introduced the detachment to evidence-based 
policing and became central to the detachment’s ability to analyze crime statistics and 
trends. Through her analysis of recorded crime, Becket assisted the detachment in 
determining what crime problems (crime hot spots, prolific offenders, and causes of 
crime) needed attention and which problems were simply being perceived as problems 
either by the community or by police officers themselves.  
 The COMPSTAT document used during management meetings was developed 
based on similar formats used in New York, Vancouver, and many other North American 
cities.  When Beckett arrived, the COMPSTAT document used in Coquitlam was a 
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retrospective tool that indicated what crime trends had occurred. The result was that the 
unit commanders and management would simply speak to what had happened and what 
the police had and were doing to alter those patterns. Becket was able to assist in 
transforming this document into a planning document, one which would aid the 
management team to better plan their tactics. Becket did so mainly by creating a target 
range for certain crime types and by breaking the document into two crime categories. 
The target range was based on six years of crime data and took seasonal differences into 
consideration. This promoted the idea of long term planning and curbed the tendency to 
react to spikes in crime. Breaking the crime categories into two types, reactive crime and 
proactive crime, allowed detachment management to see at a quick glance if reactive 
crimes, such as break and enter and auto theft, were decreasing and if proactive crime 
types, like impaired driving, possession of stolen property, or drugs, were on the increase. 
The new COMPSTAT form became a strategic planning document, rather than a report. 
Management could now not only plan their initiatives, but evaluate and measure the 
results of their operations with this document. 
 In late 2006, Beckett also assisted in integrating CR strategies into front-line 
policing. The Prolific Offender Management Project was introduced to the regular 
members on general duty. Becket’s emphasis was on street checks.22 Her intent was to 
gather as much intelligence as possible on any prolific offender and also measure where 
the street checks were occurring. This information assisted in advising police officers on 
where best to patrol based not only on crime events, but on known prolific offender 
hangouts. Becket also attended morning briefings and asked regular members to obtain 
                                                 
22 Street checks are police-public contacts that are recorded on police information systems. Generally, street 
checks are conducted when a police officer encounters a suspicious person or known offender while on 
patrol. 
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information on offender whereabouts, residences, associates, and habits. This process was 
facilitated by Superintendent Lepine’s insistence that managers should be accountable for 
the street checks made by police officers during their shifts. From 2005 to 2008, 
Coquitlam Detachment saw street checks double each year.23 
 
Detachment Indicators of Success 
 
Superintendent Lepine proceeded to implement a COMPSTAT style 
accountability framework during the detachment management weekly meetings. This 
practice began in 2006 and continues to be a key feature of the Coquitlam RCMP CR 
Strategy. Some of the early recorded results included a consistent drop in auto theft in the 
Coquitlam area: these included a year to date 15% drop in January 2006, a 22% drop in 
March 2006, and a 43% drop by December 2006.24 
 In 2007, many other milestones for the implementation of CR strategies in 
Coquitlam were reached. The launch of a new Detachment Performance Plan (DPP), an 
assessment method which monitored national detachment initiatives, such as youth 
strategies and road safety initiatives, was altered to include the tenets of CR. The 
concepts of hot spots, prolific offenders, and crime causation were thought to dovetail 
perfectly with and would contribute to achieving the detachment’s overall goals. This 
meant that the three tenets of CR would now be under constant review from the strategic 
planning perspective. Incorporating CR into the detachment DPP required a re-
examination of routine operations and making changes to best exercise CR thinking. For 
instance, the Detachment management felt it was important to incorporate their youth 
                                                 
23 This was confirmed in personal communication with Crime Analyst Andi Beckett on 2009-01-05. 
24 These figures were provided by C/M Crime Analyst Andi Beckett. 
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strategy into their CR approach.  
In early 2007, the school liaison unit turned its attention to prolific youth 
offenders and began acquiring more intelligence on chronic offenders who were outside 
the school system. They also began actively conducting curfew checks on any young 
offender who met their criteria as a persistent young offender. This also required more 
direct contact with youth probation officers and a more formalized method of 
communicating between agencies. The traffic section also attempted to embrace CR 
philosophy. By targeting speeders and people who did not wear seatbelts at repeat crash 
locations, as well as conducting proactive surveillance on particularly dangerous 
prohibited drivers, they were able to contribute to public safety through traffic 
enforcement. This active engagement of many specialized units demonstrated that the 
detachment management was incorporating the three CR Tenets in their everyday tactical 
operations, as well as their long term strategic planning. Slowly but surely, all of the 
Coquitlam Detachment's sections came to realize that they had a role to play in the 
broader detachment strategy of CR. 
In the early months of 2007, “E” Division Deputy Commissioner Beverly Busson, 
an avid supporter of CR strategies, was appointed Commissioner of the RCMP, and she 
recognized CR as a promising practice at a national level.25 Following this 
acknowledgement of support, the Coquitlam Detachment became the center of study by 
detachment commanders from outside the province. Officers from New-Brunswick, 
Nova-Scotia, and Alberta visited the detachment to see for themselves what was being 
done to drive crime rates down with such success. 
                                                 
25 Commissioner Busson’s affirmation that CR was made a national initiative cannot be confirmed in 
RCMP documents. This is the understanding and view of Superintendent Peter Lepine expressed during a 
discussion with me in March 2008. 
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Communications Strategy 
 In July 2006, the Coquitlam Detachment hired its first CR Communications 
Strategist, a civilian named Danielle Marchand. The detachment’s communication 
regarding CR was described during a discussion with Danielle in November, 2007. Until 
Marchand’s arrival, internal CR communication had mainly been done in the context of 
management meetings. The weekly management meetings have since evolved from a 
style in which managers were to stand up and account for the crime statistics provided by 
the Crime Analyst, to more specific problem solving meetings in which section heads 
worked together to find solutions and prioritize the crime trends that are brought to their 
attention through crime analysis. The frequency of these meetings were reduced to one 
CR meeting every two weeks to allow for more meaningful discussions, and led to less 
reactive solutions to local crime problems.  
           One topic that was of concern at these meetings was the lack of constructive 
internal and external communications about the successes of CR. This need was 
addressed with the development of the Coquitlam RCMP Reports on Crime and Safety. 
These reports were circulated both internally via e-mail to all detachment members and 
externally to the public, community stakeholders, and local leadership. (See Figure 3) 
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Figure 3 - Coquitlam Crime Reduction Communications Benchmarks 
Volume 1, Issue 1, Annual Report February 9th, 2007 
• The detachment will be using intelligence and analysis to develop effective strategies to reduce crime 
and increase public safety. 
• CR Tenets are: Prolific Offenders, Crime Hotspots, and Root Crime Causation. 
• CR Tools are Crime Analysis and Public Safety Partnerships. 
• With regards to non-police issues from mental health to unsightly properties: “…the police must work 
with partners in the community to find solutions to the underlying issues in order to be truly effective”.
Volume 1, Issue 1, April 2007 
• More messaging and further definition of the three tenets of CR and the two tools of CR. 
• Detailed chart with the quarterly crime statistics along with further discussion of crime trend analysis. 
• CRU arrested 10 local prolific offenders as a “direct result of strategic targeting initiatives”. The report 
attributes the drop in vehicle theft to the incarceration of these prolifics. 
• Compared to the previous quarter, crime stats indicate a 15% decrease in vehicle theft, a 42% decrease 
in possession of stolen property and a 25% reduction in theft from vehicles.  
Volume 1, Issue 2, July 2007 
• Announcement that Coquitlam Detachment is “moving beyond piloting towards full implementation of 
CR…the move is based on the positive impacts that CR has had on how we do business”. 
• Discussion of crime types that will be targeted through a CR strategy: property crime such as theft 
from and of auto and break and enter. 
• Article about the success of joint enforcement project between General Duty CRU, the bait car 
program and IMPACT. A strategically placed bait car was activated and a known prolific offender was 
apprehended.  
Volume 1, Issue 3, October 2007 
• Further discussion of the successes of CR.  “Crime Reduction case studies indicate that by focusing on 
the three tenets of Crime Reduction – prolific offenders, crime hot spots and root causation factors – 
the police will have more impact on reducing crime than by focusing solely on random patrol and 
rapid response to calls.” 
• Description of two public safety partnership initiatives: the Public Safety Inspection Teams (PSIT) 
targeting suspected grow-ops, and the Coordinated Enforcement Team (CET), a by-law enforcement 
team for derelict properties. 
  
Formal CR training received by Coquitlam Detachment police officers was and 
continues to be limited. It appears that the management and supervisory team, as well as 
the Crime Analyst and Communications Strategist, are familiar with the philosophy of 
CR. They have gained their knowledge through various meetings, presentations, and 
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discussions with other police officers and academics.  
 RCMP officers in all units have received informal training through discussions at 
morning briefings. For instance, Superintendent Lepine discusses CR strategies to 
officers during briefing. For example, he describes the general duty’s role in CR as one of 
disruption of crime and asks general duty police officers to conduct street checks on 
known offenders in an effort to dissuade them from offending in the location in which 
they were found, and then to record any information they acquired on the police database 
(PRIME: Police Records Information Management Environment). He explains that one 
of the central roles of general duty police officers is to assist in breaking the daily cycle 
of an offender’s pattern of crime. The Crime Analyst also emphasizes the importance of 
good quality street checks and has asked general duty police officers to ask more 
questions of their offenders, such as inquiring about where they live, what they are up to, 
and what they might have on their person, etc. Becket then plots these street checks on a 
map along with the offences that are recorded during the same time frame. She then goes 
back to the officers and demonstrates the practical application of these street checks. 
 New officers to the force, those new recruits who have graduated from Depot and 
arrive in Coquitlam for their first posting, are required to answer a few questions about 
CR during their ‘board examination’.  Board examinations occur at the six month mark of 
an RCMP officer's field training, and the board comprises the detachment management 
team. No formal preparation exists for the board and any knowledge of CR offered by the 
recruit in his or her answers has been gained through conversations with other RCMP 
officers and through word of mouth. To the time this study was completed, the Coquitlam 
Detachment members had not received formal training in CR. The level of success in the 
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area of CR training, and further, the level of acceptance of CR amongst the police 
officers in Coquitlam, has not been measured.  
As we have seen, the leadership of Coquitlam detachment has gone to some 
length to incorporate CR in daily detachment operations. The following chapter will 
explore the extent to which the regular members of Coquitlam Detachment have engaged 
in and adhered to the principles of CR. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology and Results 
This chapter provides a picture of police officer attitudes, knowledge, and 
behaviour within a CR detachment based on the results of a survey of police officers at 
the Coquitlam RCMP Detachment. The survey was intended to measure the extent to 
which police officers from the Coquitlam RCMP Detachment engaged in activities that 
embodied the tenets of CR during their daily work routines and duties. In short, the 
survey served as a diagnostic tool for measuring the level of detachment engagement in 
CR and allowed the researcher to establish a baseline for further research. The aim of the 
survey was not to provide definitive answers on the topics discussed, but rather served as 
an exploratory study to indicate areas that require further research.  
The survey was administered to all willing Coquitlam RCMP Detachment officers 
between June 15th and June 30th, 2008 (see Appendix A). Officers were told the 
questionnaire would take ten to fifteen minutes to complete. They were also informed 
that their participation was voluntary and that all survey responses would be anonymous. 
At the time of the survey, the Coquitlam RCMP Detachment comprised 187 police 
officers. Twenty of these police officers were either on annual, illness, long-term, or 
maternity leave, or serving secondments to other specialized or integrated units outside 
the detachment. The remaining 167 police officers were asked to complete the survey, 
and 134 volunteered to do so. Accordingly, the response rate for the survey is 80%. 
The approach was not without its limitations. The analysis is restricted to the 
views and experiences police officers of one particular detachment. Future study could 
involve the use of the same instrument in other detachments. Should the survey be 
repeated, it is recommended that the number of questions be reduced. Also, the survey 
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was designed to elicit only police officer views and experiences of CR and its 
implementation. The current study does not include the many civilian personnel, 
auxiliaries, or volunteers within detachments, many of whom play an active role in CR as 
a policing strategy.  
Characteristics of Sample 
 As demonstrated in Table 1, nearly three-quarters (74.2 per cent) of officers 
surveyed were male, and the large majority (78.7 per cent) were at the constable rank. 
Further, a majority (58.7 per cent) worked as general duty officers, and nearly half (49.6 
per cent) had more than four years of police service. Overall, using these characteristics 
as an indicator, the sample was not only representative of officers working in the 
Coquitlam RCMP detachment, but was also a reasonable representation of the population 
of RCMP officers assigned to municipal policing in BC.26 
Table 1 - Characteristics of Sample 
Characteristic Considered % (n = 134) 
Male Gender 74.2 
Length of service  
0 – 12 months 15.5 
13 – 23 months 17.1 
2 – 4 years 17.8 
Over 4 years 49.6 
Rank  
Constable 78.7 
Supervisor (Cpl., Sgt., S/Sgt., Insp., Superintendent) 19.6 
Work Section  
General Duty 58.7 
CR Unit 13.2 
Other Specialized Sections 28.1 
                                                 
26 This was confirmed through personal communication with Inspector Maureen Levy, Officer in charge, 
Promotions, Policy, & Planning Unit, RCMP “E” Division, Human Resource, Development & Resourcing 
Section on 2009-01-30. 
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Results 
 
 Analysis of the 134 completed questionnaires provided for an assessment of 
officers’ responses to all but five questions asked/statements posed by the survey.27 The 
results revealed that there was a great degree of overall consensus in responses to the 
survey items from all officers responding. Further, in instances where there was no 
general consensus, that is to say when the responses were split, there were no differences 
in terms of gender, length of service, rank, or officer assigned work section.  
 The first portion of the survey asked RCMP officers to describe what they thought 
and felt about CR in the context of their daily work. As demonstrated in Table 2 there 
was strong consensus that partnership working was important in reducing crime (88 per 
cent), and an overwhelming majority of police officers (96 per cent) approved of the 
strategy of engaging in surveillance of chronic offenders. Conversely, the majority (58 
per cent) of officers disagreed when asked if police should be involved in social work or 
social development related work. Despite the fact that addressing the root causes of crime 
is one of the three tenets of CR, this result indicated that officers were inclined towards 
enforcement, rather than “softer” methods of crime prevention and CR.  
 
                                                 
27 The following survey sections/statements were not considered in the final analysis as they did not 
contribute to the general findings of this research:  
1) Section 1, Statement 7: I am not interested in conducting proactive surveillance on currently active 
offenders. 
2) Section 1, Statement 28: I feel less job satisfaction in my current work than I did while on general duty 
patrol. 
3) Section 1, Statement 29: I feel that what I do in my current job is more proactive than the work I did in 
other units. 
4) Section 1, Statement 37: There are clear goals and objectives for my job. 
5) Section 1, Statement 39: I am proud of the work being carried out in my work unit. 
6) Section 3 was removed. 
7) Section 9 was removed. 
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Table 2 - Officers’ View on Best Approach to Reducing Crime 
STATEMENT     PERCENT  
OF 
OFFICERS 
WHO 
AGREED 
Engaging in the surveillance of chronic offenders is an effective use of 
police resources. 
96% 
The best way to reduce crime is to improve co-operation between Police, 
Probation, and Crown Counsel with regards to chronic offenders. 
88% 
Based on what I know about Crime Reduction, I have confidence that Crime 
Reduction Strategies will be helpful in reducing crime. 
85% 
Law enforcement would be more effective if it put more resources and 
commitment into crime prevention through social development. 
50% 
In the course of their everyday work, general duty members should be 
attentive towards activities that would normally be seen as social work 
oriented. 
43% 
*n = 143. All figures rounded. Collapsed four point scale used including “Strongly Agree”, “Agree”, 
“Disagree”, and “Strongly Disagree”. Statements located in Section 1. 
         
In CR detachments, producing lengthy reports to Crown prosecutors was seen as 
invaluable in the process of achieving meaningful sentencing of chronic offenders. Table 
3 offers insight into the extent to which the Coquitlam RCMP officers would go to 
provide the Court with information about these persistent offenders. An overwhelming 
majority of officers (91 per cent) felt that providing the Court with enough information to 
remand a chronic offender into custody was an effective use of their time, while nearly 
two-thirds (61 per cent) agreed that simply writing extensive reports on chronic offenders 
was an effective use of time. In other words, if the result of an officer writing an 
extensive report was imprisonment, it was worth a member’s time, while simply 
providing the Court with more information on a chronic offender was less worthy of their 
time. This further demonstrated that Coquitlam RCMP officers had a greater interest in 
strategies that involved enforcement that led to incarceration than strategies that did not. 
 There is another issue to consider when interpreting these results. There exists an 
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underlying assumption that the Crown prosecutors and judges read, interpret, and use the 
information provided by police on chronic offenders to appropriately deal with these 
offenders. However, one-quarter of officers (25 per cent) disagreed that writing chronic 
offender reports assisted the Court in reaching meaningful sentencing. As will be 
discussed below, this may be linked to officer beliefs that the biggest obstacle they face 
when it comes to CR is ‘buy-in from judges’. This indicates that police officers in 
Coquitlam were, to some extent, cynical about the effectiveness of the criminal justice 
system. 
Table 3 – Officers’ Interest in Report Writing  
Statement  Percent of 
Officers Who 
Agreed 
Providing the Court with enough information to remand chronic offenders 
into custody is an effective use of my time. 
91% 
Writing chronic offender reports will assist the court in reaching 
meaningful sentencing. 
74% 
The time to prepare extensive court reports on chronic offenders is an 
effective use of my time. 
61% 
*n = 143. All figures rounded. Collapsed four point scale used including “Strongly Agree”, “Agree”, 
“Disagree”, and “Strongly Disagree”. Statements located in Section 1. 
 
          Table 4 presents data related to officers' attitudes towards three general CR ideals: 
crime hot spots; the use of crime statistics as both a public accountability measure and a 
means for determining resource deployment; and the police's role in the reduction of fear 
of crime. Once again, in the findings, there was a high degree of consensus that targeting 
hot spots and measuring success based on crime statistics were good police practices. 
There was, however, a split regarding the police's role in reducing the fear of crime. 
Specifically, approximately one-third of Coquitlam RCMP officers (34 per cent) did not 
feel that police should work towards the reduction of fear of crime. Reducing fear of 
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crime is one of the foundational tenets of community policing, a policing model that was, 
to some extent, pushed aside in this particular detachment for CR. Therefore, one may 
infer that some community policing ideals were not held in high regard by Coquitlam 
Detachment RCMP officers, whereas basic tenets of CR, such as targeting hot spots, were 
firmly endorsed.  
However, only one-third of Coquitlam police officers (34 per cent) felt that it was 
valuable to consult the Detachment crime analyst for information on hot spots. This could 
mean one of two things: either a lack of appreciation of the role of a Crime Analyst in 
policing or detachment officers were getting their crime analysis intelligence from 
someone other than their crime analyst. This second possibility will be discussed in a 
following section on CR training. 
Table 4 - Officers’ Views on Best Police Practices 
Statement  Percent of 
Officers Who
Agreed 
Targeting hot spots is a useful strategy for determining where to conduct 
patrols. 
92% 
Tracking crime trends for changes or patterns in rates of crimes is useful in 
deciding how police resources should be allocated. 
82% 
Comparing crime statistics over time is an important way to keep my 
detachment accountable to the community we serve. 
78% 
I feel that the easiest way to find hot spots is to consult the detachment crime 
analyst. 
67% 
Police should work towards reducing the fear of crime. 66% 
*n = 143. All figures rounded. Collapsed four point scale used including “Strongly Agree”, “Agree”, 
“Disagree”, and “Strongly Disagree”. Statements located in Section 1. 
 
 As demonstrated by Table 5, there was wide acceptance of CR as the ideal service 
delivery model for policing in Coquitlam. In effect, approximately three-quarters of 
officers had a positive attitude regarding the adoption of CR. There was no variation in 
responses based on rank, length of service, gender, or current work area. 
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Table 5 - Officers’ Views on CR in General 
Statement  Percent of 
Officers Who 
Agreed 
I am pleased that the RCMP in this division has adopted a Crime Reduction 
model. 
84% 
Crime Reduction Strategies are the future of policing. 75% 
I do not think Crime Reduction Strategies better equip me to affect change 
in my community. 
27% 
*n = 143. All figures rounded. Collapsed four point scale used including “Strongly Agree”, “Agree”, 
“Disagree”, and “Strongly Disagree”. Statements located in Section 1. 
           
Noteworthy, property crime rates in Coquitlam and Port Coquitlam decreased 
significantly since the commencement of the CR initiative. Further, Criminal Code calls 
for service in Coquitlam and Port Coquitlam also decreased since 2005.28 Meanwhile, the 
number of police officers serving Coquitlam has increased from 168 in 2005 to 199 by 
the end of 2008.29  This represents a 16 per cent increase in manpower. Therefore, calls 
for service per officer in Coquitlam have decreased since 2005. In other words, on 
average, Coquitlam RCMP officers were less busy responding to calls for service at the 
time of the study than they had been in 2005. Despite this data and despite widespread 
acceptance that CR is, and should be, the model of policing adhered to within the 
Coquitlam Detachment, there was no corresponding feeling that CR had positively 
affected workload or morale. Officers felt that they were no better able to balance work 
and life since the implementation of CR. In fact, many officers felt that CR had increased 
the job-related demands placed on them. For instance, as noted in Table 6, just over half 
of the officers (55 per cent) felt that their work had increased and slightly more than two-
thirds (69 per cent) did not feel that they had more free time for proactive investigations 
                                                 
28 Statistics  were obtained from the Police Services website. 
http://www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/police_services/publications/ 
29 Confirmed by Superintendent Peter Lepine via e-mail communication on 2008-12-09. 
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since CR was implemented. Clearly, Coquitlam RCMP officers did not yet understand or 
experience CR as a means to reduce the work related pressures on police officers. 
Table 6 - Officers’ View on Impact of Crime Reduction on Workload 
Statement  Percent of 
Officers Who 
Agreed 
I am satisfied with my job. 89% 
The way I choose to do my job has not changed since the implementation 
of Crime Reduction Strategies. 
65% 
Since Crime Reduction was implemented, I feel that my workload has 
increased. 
55% 
Since Crime Reduction was implemented, I feel that I have been able to 
spend more time conducting proactive investigations. 
31% 
Since Crime Reduction was implemented, I feel I have been able to 
balance my personal, family, and work needs in my current job. 
30% 
Since Crime Reduction was implemented, I feel that morale at work has 
improved. 
29% 
*n = 143. All figures rounded. Collapsed four point scale used including “Strongly Agree”, “Agree”, 
“Disagree”, and “Strongly Disagree”. Statements located in Section 1. 
 
          Proper training is viewed as critical to the full implementation of any new policing 
strategy or change in service delivery. Table 7 describes the level to which the Coquitlam 
RCMP officers felt they had been adequately trained in CR. At first glance, the results 
appear contradictory as approximately half of officers surveyed felt that the training 
provided at the implementation phase of CR was lacking. Yet, officers felt they were 
getting clear direction from their supervisors on their role in CR. This may suggest that 
even if a number of officers (and supervisors, for that matter) do not clearly understand 
what CR means, they do still clearly understand the expectations management have of 
them in the performance of their daily duties as they relate to CR. One could then further 
conclude that the supervisors and leaders in Coquitlam were doing a good job in clearly 
directing their subordinates with regard to what they understood were CR initiatives, 
whether or not officers overall understood what CR was and what they should be doing.  
  57
 As previously noted, there was no difference between the responses of officers 
from constable or corporal level or higher level ranks. Unlike the impediments 
experienced by many detachments during the initial implementation of community 
policing in the 1990s, the middle management personnel in this detachment cannot be 
similarly seen as a potential stumbling block. To the contrary, the data in this survey 
indicated that the supervisors in the Coquitlam RCMP were acting as intermediaries 
between the crime analyst and the officers on patrol. They were supporting the tenets of 
CR by delegating CR tasks to officers under their supervision. 
Table 7 - Officers’ Understanding of CR 
Statement  Percent of 
Officers Who 
Agreed 
I understand my role in Crime Reduction. 91% 
I understand what my supervisors expect of me regarding Crime 
Reduction initiatives.  
87% 
I understand the criteria for an offender to be identified as a prolific 
offender. 
68% 
The implementation of Crime Reduction was well planned. 55% 
I understand all the methods used in Crime Reduction Strategies. 51% 
I have received training regarding the tenets of Crime Reduction 
Strategies.  
40% 
I am satisfied with the training opportunities I have received to improve 
my knowledge of Crime Reduction Strategies. 
36% 
The implementation of Crime Reduction Strategies was not undertaken in 
a way that was made clear to me. 
35% 
*n = 143. All figures rounded. Collapsed four point scale used including “Strongly Agree”, “Agree”, 
“Disagree”, and “Strongly Disagree”. Statements located in Section 1. 
 
 CR within the RCMP in British Columbia is defined as a marriage of community 
policing, problem-oriented policing, and intelligence-led policing. Respondents were 
asked to describe what they actually did in the context of their daily work. Table 8 
outlines the extent to which Coquitlam RCMP officers utilized crime analysis products 
and advice in their day-to-day work. Results indicated that a minority of officers (39 per 
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cent) used their crime analyst to direct street level resources to specific crime trends, but 
more than two-thirds (69 per cent) used the crime analyst to identify hot spots. Only a 
small proportion of officers (6 per cent) stated that the Detachment crime analyst always 
or often attended watch briefings and informed the watches about current findings. 
However, these findings are countered by the description of the COMPSTAT process in 
Chapter Two which indicated that the crime analyst was central to supervisory 
management meetings in which crime trends, targets, and locations of concern were 
discussed. In effect, these findings further reinforced the notion that officers were getting 
proper direction from their supervisors with regards to CR as noted in Table 5. It seems 
that, despite the fact that the crime analyst does not regularly attend watch briefings, 
information regarding CR priorities was making its way to the personnel who needed it 
most, namely the officers on patrol. 
Table 8 - Officers’ Level of Interaction with Crime Analyst  
Statement  Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
I use the information provided by 
my detachment crime analyst 
regarding hotspots.  
8% 23% 39% 26% 4% 
I consult with the detachment crime 
analyst regarding crimes under 
investigation or crime trends. 
25% 36% 22%  14% 3% 
The detachment crime analyst 
attends briefings and informs my 
watch about current findings. 
35%  37% 22% 6%  0%  
*n = 143. All figures rounded. Five point scale used including “Never”, “Rarely”, “Sometimes”, “Often”, 
and “Always”. Statements located in Section 2. 
 
 Table 9 provides an overview of the degree to which police officers in Coquitlam 
probed into their subject’s addiction, mental health, and housing issues. Although a 
minority of officers (roughly 40 per cent) often or always took the time to ask their 
subjects questions on these topics, only a small proportion (roughly 15 to 20 per cent) 
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often or always offered to refer their subjects to various social services. It is not 
understood if the noted lack of interest in making such referrals was due to the general 
lack of interest in ‘social work’ oriented police work, a lack of knowledge of services 
available, or merely a symptom of the lack of addictions and mental health treatment 
options in this particular community.  
 One of the CR practices shown to have had success in the United Kingdom is 
‘Lifestyle’ interviews. These interactions with offenders require police to ask personal 
questions about the offender’s criminogenic issues. They are in-depth interviews that 
allow police to better understand the life conditions of their clients in order to offer better 
assistance through referrals. Lifestyle interviews also provide an opportunity for officers 
to record admissions relating to levels of habitual drug use and crime pattern that is often 
useful information for prosecution and sentencing.30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk 
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Table 9 - Officers’ Behaviour in Responses Social Issues  
Statement  Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
When I conduct a street check, I 
ask the subject probing questions 
about any addiction issues. 
3% 11% 38% 35% 12% 
When I conduct a street check, if 
the subject tells me they are drug 
addicted, I refer them to local 
addiction services. 
15% 36% 37% 11% 2% 
When I conduct a street check, I 
ask the subject probing questions 
about their housing situation. 
3% 11% 28% 46% 13% 
When I conduct a street check, if 
the subject tells me they are 
homeless, I refer them to local 
housing services. 
15% 34% 32% 16% 4% 
When I conduct a street check, I 
ask the subject probing questions 
about their apparent mental health 
condition. 
5% 17% 48% 23% 6% 
When I arrest a person with a 
lengthy criminal record, I take time 
to have an informal discussion 
about their life circumstances. 
5% 14% 35% 39% 7% 
When I arrest a person with a 
lengthy criminal record, I conduct a 
warned statement interview. 
5% 16% 41% 25% 14% 
*n = 143. All figures rounded. Five point scale used including “Never”, “Rarely”, “Sometimes”, “Often”, 
and “Always”. Statements located in Section 2. 
 
 
          As the term ‘intel’ was not operationally-defined within the survey instrument, it is 
difficult, in retrospect, to determine what ‘intel’ should be taken to mean. Generally 
speaking, information about the criminal activity of a subject and the activities of a 
subject’s associates would be considered ‘intel’ by police officers. In fact, any 
information gained that may be used to conduct enforcement action in the future is likely 
considered ‘intel’. As indicated in Table 10, a large majority of officers (84 per cent) said 
they were recording ‘intel’ on the offenders they street checked. What is interesting is 
that only slightly more than one-third of officers (38 per cent) regularly recorded 
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admissions on a subject's addictions and mental health condition on PRIME. 
Accordingly, the ‘intel’ recorded on offenders regarding drug use and other social factors 
in an offender’s life could be improved upon. Compliance in this area would likely 
inform the crime analyst and other police officers of potential underlying causes of the 
offender’s criminality, as well as provide valuable information regarding local drug 
traffickers and their associates to officers of drug enforcement sections. Given this, there 
is an opportunity to focus more attention to the underlying causes of crime as this 
detachment pursues efforts to reduce crime and fear of crime in this community.  
Table 10 - Level of Information Gained and Recorded When Interacting with 
Subjects 
Statement Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
When I conduct a street check, I 
electronically record all the intel I 
have gathered on the subject on 
PRIME. 
2% 0% 13% 42% 42% 
When I conduct a street check, I 
electronically record all the intel I 
have gathered on the subject’s 
apparent mental health conditions on 
PRIME. 
4% 15% 44% 30% 8% 
When I conduct a street check, I 
electronically record all the intel 
regarding the subject's addiction 
issues on PRIME. 
4% 15% 43% 25% 14% 
The intelligence I gather when I have 
interviewed a suspect is recorded on 
PRIME. 
1% 4% 33% 32%  30% 
When I have had an informal 
discussion with a suspect, I record 
the information I have on PRIME. 
8% 20% 41% 21% 11% 
*n = 143. All figures rounded. Five point scale used including “Never”, “Rarely”, “Sometimes”, “Often”, 
and “Always”. Statements located in Section 2. 
 
Table 11 presents data indicating potential gaps in intelligence sharing that may 
occur within the Coquitlam Detachment. The results are promising as a greater 
proportion of police officers stated that they were sharing intelligence with one another 
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than those who said they do not, and officers appeared to generally have access to 
intelligence on offenders as needed. However, as noted in Table 10, the extent of 
intelligence on offender lifestyles could be improved upon. This would increase the broad 
sharing of information already taking place at the detachment. Moreover, officers were 
asked about their knowledge of the location of drug houses in their patrol area. Slightly 
more than one-fifth (22 per cent) of officers never or rarely knew the location of these 
crime attractors, and the majority (56 per cent) of officers stated that they conducted 
street checks near the drug houses and crime hot spots in their patrol area.  
Table 11 - Officers’ Views and Experiences on Information and Intelligence Sharing 
Statement   Never Rarely Some- 
times 
Often Always 
I discuss the content of conversations I have with 
subjects who are known to be chronic offenders 
with other members of the detachment. 
2% 7% 33% 48% 11% 
When I need intelligence on a chronic offender, I 
look to other members to better understand the 
background of the offender. 
1% 5% 32% 45% 17% 
I attend watch briefings to increase my 
knowledge of current detachment priorities, such 
as chronic offenders and current crime hot spots. 
1% 5% 19% 34% 41% 
I have easy access to intelligence on chronic 
offenders. 
3% 14% 35% 40% 9% 
I am not kept informed about the offenders who 
are being targeted by the CR Team. 
14% 34% 28% 16% 8% 
I am kept informed about current crime analysis 
findings through watch briefings. 
3% 15% 43% 30% 9% 
I am not kept informed regarding current hot 
spots through watch briefings. 
11% 33% 41%  10% 5% 
Intelligence on chronic offenders is stored on an 
electronic system that I have access to. 
8% 11% 28% 33% 19% 
I know the location of all the known drug houses 
in my patrol area. 
3% 19% 35% 33% 11% 
I conduct street checks near the drug houses and 
hot spots in my area. 
2% 10% 33% 42% 14% 
*n = 143. All figures rounded. Five point scale used including “Never”, “Rarely”, “Sometimes”, “Often”, 
and “Always”. Statements located in Section 2. 
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 The results in Table 12 highlighted the information police officers tended to 
include in their reports to Crown Counsel. It appears that enforcement related 
information, such as criminal histories and the number of negative police contacts, were 
commonly included in court documents. In contrast, information on the offender’s mental 
health, substance use, housing, and employment histories were only included half of the 
time. This suggests an area in which the police may improve on the level of pertinent 
sentencing information they present to the Court. It can be assumed that broader 
compliance in the recording of lifestyle related intelligence on PRIME would assist in the 
preparation of court documents. 
Table 12 - Information Included in Reports to Crown Counsel  
Information on reports Percent of Police officers 
who include this info 
information on the offender’s previous criminal history 84% 
details regarding his/her history of probation breaches 73% 
his/her negative police contacts (from PRIME) 71% 
his/her negative police contacts (from Pirs) 61% 
his/her mental health history 54% 
his/her addiction history 52% 
his/her Federal and Provincial correctional records 50% 
details regarding his/her history of warrants 50% 
his/her current housing condition 50% 
his/her employment history 36% 
*n = 143. Question located in Section 4. 
 
 Table 13 shows to what extent officers assigned to patrol were utilizing the 
information they acquired regarding high crime areas. At first glance, it appears that there 
was a high degree of compliance in this area, placing ‘Cops on dots’ appeared to be 
happening as officers indicated that they were effectively using intelligence in between 
calls for service. But, to what extent were police officers using this type of intelligence 
when they needed to catch up on paperwork or finish entering information required for 
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files attended that day? As a matter of note, the survey elicited contradictory responses 
from police officers in this area. In this regard, when officers received information on a 
rash of business break and enters in a given area, a majority (62 per cent) reported that 
they responded by writing their files at the location. Officers were also asked where they 
wrote their outstanding files. Only a small proportion (15 per cent) said they did so at the 
location of a specific crime hot spot, while nearly two-thirds (60 per cent) stated that they 
did so either at the scene of or a few blocks away from the scene of the file they just 
attended.   
 One of two possible reasons likely underlies this discrepancy. First, officers were 
not consistently supplied with information on active crime hot spots or second, officers 
were talking the talk, but not walking the walk regarding deterrent patrols at hot spot 
locations. Officer safety may be another factor influencing the decision to not do their 
paperwork in a high crime location. As officer safety is paramount, police officers may 
choose not to do paperwork at such locations due to the risks associated with not having 
their full attention on the environment and activities outside their patrol car. Nevertheless, 
it seems that opportunities to spend downtime or paperwork time at troublesome 
locations are missed. However, the reason why officers may not choose to use their 
downtime effectively by doing their paperwork in an area where their very presence may 
have a deterrent effect on crime is not of particular interest within the current research. 
What is of interest is the fact that there were inconsistencies in the responses relating to 
this topic.  
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Table 13 - Patrols Done Due to Intelligence Received During Briefing 
 Question asked Yes 
conduct patrols to these areas in between calls 77% 
conduct street checks in this location 63% 
write my files in this area 62% 
go from call to call and do not alter my patrols 1% 
*n = 143. All figures rounded. Statements located in Section 5. 
 
Officers were also asked to what extent and in what locations they conducted 
street checks. Officers indicated that, in the course of a typical block of shifts, they 
conducted, on average, 3.6 street checks. Officers also indicated that they conducted 
patrols to known problem residences in their patrol area 8.8 times in the course of a 
typical block of shifts. It should be noted that some police officers claimed to be 
conducting as many as 20 street checks during any given block of shifts. This information 
may be of interest to supervisors who are looking for baseline figures and averages for 
officer performance evaluations and may also assist in measuring how often officers are 
conducting street checks without creating PRIME files. 
In contrast to the fact that patrolling crime hot spots is generally accepted as an 
everyday practice, the practice of referring offenders to outside agencies that may assist 
them with the underlying causes of their crime is less entrenched. As noted in Table 14, 
officers did not appear to have information, such as telephone numbers of addictions 
treatment centres, homeless shelters, and mental health services, at their immediate 
disposal. This was consistent with the results of a question where officers were asked: 
“When I conduct a street check, if the subject tells me they are drug addicted, I refer them 
to local addiction services”.  Approximately half of officers (51 per cent) responded that 
they never or rarely referred people to addiction services. Only a third of officers (33 per 
cent) stated that they had the contact information on homeless shelters at the ready, while 
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slightly more than half (57 per cent) have information on mental health services. In fact, 
crime causation is the tenet of CR that the Coquitlam RCMP officers seemed less 
committed to acting upon. As discussed later, this could be due to several factors that are, 
to some extent, beyond the control and scope of police. 
Table 14 - Officers’ Access to Outside Service Agency Referral Info 
Statement  Yes 
I have telephone numbers, addresses, and contact information on local drug 
addiction services ready at all times. 
22% 
I have telephone numbers, addresses, and contact information on homeless 
shelters at the ready at all times. 
33% 
I have telephone numbers, addresses, and contact information on mental health 
services at the ready at all times. 
57% 
*n = 143. All figures rounded. Statements located in Section 6, 7, and 8. 
 
Coquitlam RCMP police officers were also asked to rank what intervention 
options were most likely to interrupt an offender’s pattern of offending from most 
effective to the least. In considering the findings presented in Table 15, it is important to 
note that respondents were asked to rank these options for the average offender, and were 
not prompted to rank order these options for any particular type of offender, such as a 
youth, a prolific offender, or by a specific type of crime. This question was simply 
intended to provide the researcher with a general idea about police officers’ attitudes 
towards particular criminal justice interventions. As indicated by Table 15, Coquitlam 
RCMP officers felt that the best intervention option was incarceration, but there appeared 
to be, unsurprisingly, an underlying understanding of the link between drug addiction and 
crime. 
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Table 15 - Officers’ View on Most Effective Interventions  
Criminal Justice Intervention Most Effective Second Most 
Effective 
Incarceration 68 3 
Addiction treatment 13 32 
Mental health treatment 5 15 
Conditional Sentence Order 0 15 
Employment 2 11 
Probation 2 10 
Housing 3 3 
*n = 143. All figures rounded. Question located in Section 12. 
 
Effective CR strategies often require greater partnership working between and 
engagement of the police and other agencies. In order to best understand which groups 
the police felt would be the most difficult to engage, respondents were asked to rank 
order the partners they felt would present the greatest challenge when it came to buy-in. 
As indicated in Table 16, police felt that the most difficult group to partner with was the 
judiciary, followed by health related services. Officers found that buy-in would be most 
easily gained from social services and corrections. 
Table 16 - Officers’ Views Regarding Challenges to Implementing a CR Approach 
Partnership: No 
Challenge 
Somewhat  
Challenging 
Very 
Challenging 
Buy-in from judges 4% 40% 56% 
Availability of community resources 
(e.g.: addiction treatment, housing) 
6% 48% 46% 
Buy-in from offenders 8% 32% 61% 
Police resources 14% 70%  16% 
Buy-in from prosecutors 17% 57% 26% 
Buy-in from Social Services 25% 50% 25% 
Buy-in from Corrections 33% 57% 9% 
*n = 143. All figures rounded. Statements located in Section 13. 
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Summary of Results 
 
 The objective of this major paper was to assess the views and experiences of 
RCMP officers in one of the initial CR pilot sites, the Coquitlam Detachment. The survey 
conducted sought answers to four main questions: 1) Have Coquitlam Detachment 
RCMP officers embraced the elements of CR; 2) What are their views and experiences of 
CR; 3) To what extent are Coquitlam Detachment police officers engaged in CR; and 4) 
Are they ‘walking the talk’ or ‘just talking the talk’? With these questions in mind, the 
major findings of the survey were: 
• While there was general approval of CR as a policing strategy, 25% remained 
unconvinced that CR was the future of policing.  
• Although police officers appeared to be getting clear direction from supervisors 
regarding CR, half felt that they required more training in CR. 
• While the great majority of police officers were satisfied with their job, most did 
not feel that their workload, work life balance, or morale had improved with the 
implementation of CR. 
• Police officers generally felt that the best way to reduce crime was to target 
prolific offenders, while working with partner agencies.  
• Police officers generally favoured intervention options that were enforcement-
based. 
• Police officers felt that the most effective intervention to criminality was 
incarceration.  
• Police officers will accept doing extra paper work if this results in the 
incarceration of offenders. 
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• More than half of the police officers in this study felt that social work oriented 
activities, including referring offenders to services, were not activities that fit the 
role of the police. 
• Police officers appeared to be more interested in focusing on crime hot spots than 
addressing the root causes of crime, such as mental health and addictions. 
• When interacting with offenders, officers did ask probing questions on the life 
history of offenders. 
• There was a resistance to refer offenders to proper social services or other 
agencies that could offer support or mental health or addictions treatment. This 
may be due to a lack of knowledge or awareness of services available, or a simple 
lack in services in this particular community. 
• The shift in culture away from offence to offender is not yet fully exhibited by the 
attitudes of the police officers of the Coquitlam Detachment, but there does 
appear to be a willingness to engage offenders at an enforcement level. 
• While front-line officers would act on advice from the crime analyst if it was 
presented to them through their supervisor, they did not generally consult the 
crime analyst regarding crime trends.  
• Information sharing within the detachment could be improved as information 
sharing gaps exist between the crime analyst and patrol officers.  
• Police officers felt that gaining buy-in from judges would be the biggest challenge 
in building partnerships with outside agencies.  
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Chapter Four: Conclusions and Recommendations 
If police officers do not accept the basic tenets of CR, any CR implementation 
will not be fully realized. The police officers in Coquitlam are at the frontline of policing 
and their commitment and approval is important. Coquitlam Detachment RCMP officers, 
regardless of rank, generally approved of CR and were focused on most of its key 
components. The officers specifically targeted prolific offenders and crime hot spots, and 
to a much lesser extent, they attempted to uncover and address the root causes of crime. 
The buy-in obtained of Coquitlam police officers was, to some extent, due to the view 
that CR was a return to a focus on enforcement related practices. The key principles of 
CR are partnerships, improved accountability, and evidence-based approaches to crime. 
This study only touched on partnerships and, in this area, the officers appeared to feel as 
though they faced challenges; their concern over buy-in from other criminal justice 
agencies demonstrated this. The other potential challenge was the shift in focus away 
from crimes to criminals that CR represents. It is uncertain if police officers in Coquitlam 
acknowledge the fact that enforcement action and incarceration are not always the most 
appropriate or effective means of intervention.  
The survey responses of Coquitlam RCMP officers point to a lack of appreciation 
for the subtleties of the ‘softer’ side of CR strategies, such as the value uncovering the 
underlying causes of crime, the benefits of tailor-made responses to criminality based on 
the particular life circumstances faced by offenders, and the realization that 
improvements in social and health outcomes in the lives of some offenders could reduce 
their offending as well as, if not better, than sending them to jail for very short durations. 
This attitude was unsurprising and, to some extent, understandable. Police officers have 
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the difficult work of dealing with active criminals every single day. Police want to reduce 
crime and attend fewer calls for service. Simply put, if putting an end to a drug addicted 
criminal’s crime spree is achieved by locking them up, this is acceptable to police 
because they know the offender has at least been incapacitated. 
Although Coquitlam Detachment is well on its way towards adopting the key 
principles of CR, there is room for improvement in some respects. These include the need 
to address (or at least advocate for other agencies to take a greater role in addressing) the 
underlying causes of crime. Improvements to the police force’s understanding of CR 
principles could be gained through further training in CR. As the results of this survey 
demonstrated, training in CR may contribute to a greater appreciation for the ‘soft’ side 
of crime fighting and to improved interaction and integration with partner agencies. 
With all the various potential performance measures or outcomes in policing, such 
as lowered crime rates, reduced fear of crime amongst the public, increased partnership 
working, and the tactical use of intelligence, it is perhaps worth considering that the 
police have become overwhelmed. Just as the public demands ever more of the police, 
the police may also be asking too much of themselves. In fact, CR may be a perfect 
example of this. CR is defined as a marriage of all other kinds of policing models, 
policing models that were difficult to define and, therefore, never truly implemented in 
the first place. As mentioned in Chapter 2, without proper buy-in, policing strategies will 
not be fully institutionalised. CR, to some extent, is in danger of following the same 
trajectory as past approaches; there are so many avenues within the strategy that the 
police must make choices about which area of CR they will engage in. In the case of 
Coquitlam, they chose to focus on prolific offenders and hot spots, possibly because these 
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two CR tenets are within their ability to act upon, and influence. Our criminal justice 
system is increasingly crippling the police with ever more complicated case law and 
investigational requirements. Police agencies are mandated to use time-intensive 
information systems and the time required to attend a simple call is increasing. Police 
forces are further pressured by demographic challenges of the labour market combined 
with negative media attention that results in the loss of public trust. As a consequence, 
police agencies have decreasing resources available to manage all of these often 
contradictory strategies and priorities. In the case of Coquitlam Detachment, a rational 
choice was made: police officers should do what they do best, namely put offenders in 
jail. This allowed for a clear vision and a uniform approach from the top, down. 
The leadership of Coquitlam Detachment claimed to have made strides in 
applying the underlying philosophies of CR. The implementation is considered a 
successful work in progress by the detachment's senior management. The results of this 
study do indicate that CR implementation is occurring at a personal, tactical, and strategic 
level, yet this study also suggests that there is room for improvement on the Coquitlam 
initiative. For instance, there is an opportunity to increase officers’ engagement in 
partnership building, in their understanding of integrated justice, and in the use of 
alternative intervention approaches to criminality. If they truly desire to incorporate CR 
ideology into the everyday activities of police officers, RCMP decision-makers, 
management, and leadership will have to incorporate discussion of these issues into 
internal CR communication and training. This study assessed the level of CR training 
police officers have received and the results indicate a need for further training and 
divisional guidance on CR. The questionnaire itself could perhaps be adapted to be a CR 
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training tool.31 
Another area that should be of concern to police leadership is the fact that despite 
the sustained reductions in crime, namely property crime, there is no corresponding view 
by police in Coquitlam that CR has decreased police workload. Future studies may 
involve an analysis of what new policing activities have filled the increased time 
available from the reduced number of calls for service attended.  
Until now, there has been virtually no research on the implementation of CR in 
BC RCMP detachments. With this in mind, the results presented in this paper provide a 
benchmark and will serve as a baseline for future research and analysis. The paper 
presents an overall assessment of the level of engagement and implementation level of 
CR within the Coquitlam RCMP detachment, one of six original pilot sites. Accordingly, 
this major paper will be useful to the RCMP as it strives to better understand and improve 
upon its CR efforts. Also, as no other form of evaluation of CR pilots exists, this major 
paper should be specifically helpful to the Crime Reduction “E” Division Liaison Support 
Section in its efforts to address the training and communication needs of detachments 
across the Division. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 It should be noted that the need for CR training has begun to be addressed: several pilot courses have 
taken place in the later part or 2008, and they continue in 2009. 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
Thank you for completing this anonymous questionnaire. I hope that you will find this 
questionnaire easy to follow. In most cases, all you have to do is circle or check the answer 
that best describes how you feel. The questionnaire should take you about 15 minutes to 
complete. Please answer the following questions as honestly as possible based on your 
daily work responsibilities. 
 
As you have been advised by the enclosed covering letter, your participation is voluntary, 
and your responses will be anonymous to the RCMP and the principal researcher. In this 
regard, please remember that the questionnaires are returned directly to UCFV, all of the 
information is aggregated for reporting purposes, and we will not reveal individual 
responses to anyone.  
 
In addition to the aggregated data being used as the basis for my MA degree, an additional 
intended outcomes of the study is to provide general information to RCMP senior 
management to better inform their policy and practice decisions. 
 
 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call me at the University College of 
the Fraser Valley at 604-854-4553. For any concerns regarding the administration of 
the survey, please contact Yvon Dandurand, Associate Vice-President of Research and 
Graduate Studies at 604-864-4654. 
 
 
 
 
 Many thanks, 
 
 
 
Brigitte Goguen 
School of Criminology & Criminal Justice 
University-College of the Fraser Valley 
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1. Please circle the response that best represents how you feel: 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly
Agree  
1. The work my section/unit does has reduced crime in this community. 1 2 3 4 
2. My work is making a difference in this community. 1 2 3 4 
3. I understand what my supervisors expect of me regarding crime 
reduction initiatives. 
1 2 3 4 
4. The best way to reduce crime is to improve co-operation between 
Police, Probation, and Crown Counsel with regards to chronic offenders. 
1 2 3 4 
5. The time to prepare extensive court reports on chronic offenders is an 
effective use of my time.  
1 2 3 4 
6. Engaging in the surveillance of chronic offenders is an effective use of 
police resources. 
1 2 3 4 
7. I am not interested in conducting proactive surveillance on currently 
active offenders. 
1 2 3 4 
9. Writing chronic offender reports will assist the court in reaching 
meaningful sentencing. 
1 2 3 4 
10. Targeting hot spots is a useful strategy for determining where to 
conduct patrols. 
1 2 3 4 
11. Comparing crime statistics over time is an important way to keep my 
detachment accountable to the community we serve. 
1 2 3 4 
12. The easiest way to find hot spots is to consult the detachment crime 
analyst. 
1 2 3 4 
13. Providing the Court with enough information to remand chronic 
offenders into custody is an effective use of my time. 
1 2 3 4 
14. Tracking crime trends for changes or patterns in rates of crimes is 
useful in deciding how police resources should be allocated. 
1 2 3 4 
15. In the course of their everyday work, general duty members should be 
attentive towards activities that would normally be seen as social work 
oriented. 
1 2 3 4 
16. Law enforcement would be more effective if it put more resources and 
commitment into crime prevention through social development. 
1 2 3 4 
17. I understand the criteria for an offender to be identified as a prolific 
offender. 
1 2 3 4 
18. Police should work towards reducing the fear of crime. 1 2 3 4 
19. I understand my role in Crime Reduction. 1 2 3 4 
20. The way I choose to do my job has not changed since the 
implementation of Crime Reduction Strategies. 
1 2 3 4 
21. Based on what I know about Crime Reduction, I have confidence that 
Crime Reduction Strategies will be helpful in reducing crime.  
1 2 3 4 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly
Agree  
22. The implementation of Crime Reduction Strategies was not 
undertaken in a way that was made clear to me. 
1 2 3 4 
23. I am pleased that the RCMP in this division have adopted a Crime 
Reduction model. 
1 2 3 4 
24. I do not think Crime Reduction Strategies better equip me to affect 
change in my community. 
1 2 3 4 
25. Crime Reduction Strategies are the future of policing. 1 2 3 4 
26. I understand all the methods used in Crime Reduction Strategies. 1 2 3 4 
27. The implementation of Crime Reduction was well planned. 1 2 3 4 
28. I feel less job satisfaction in my current work 
than I did while on general duty patrol. 
1 2 3 4 
29. I feel that what I do in my current job is more proactive than the work 
I did in other units. 
1 2 3 4 
30. Since Crime Reduction was implemented, I feel that I have been able 
to spend more time conducting proactive investigations. 
1 2 3 4 
31. Since Crime Reduction was implemented, I feel I have been able to 
balance my personal, family, and work needs in my current job. 
1 2 3 4 
32. Since Crime Reduction was implemented, I feel that morale at work 
has improved. 
1 2 3 4 
33. Since Crime Reduction was implemented, I feel that my workload has 
increased. 
1 2 3 4 
34. I am satisfied with my career in the RCMP. 1 2 3 4 
35. I have received training regarding the tenets of Crime Reduction 
Strategies.  
1 2 3 4 
36. I am satisfied with the training opportunities I have received to 
improve my knowledge of Crime Reduction Strategies. 
1 2 3 4 
37. There are clear goals and objectives for my job. 1 2 3 4 
38. I am satisfied with my job. 1 2 3 4 
39. I am proud of the work being carried out in my work unit. 1 2 3 4 
 
2. Only complete this section if you ever conduct street checks or interviews of offenders. Please 
circle the response that best represents how you feel: 
  Never Rarely Some- times Often Always
1. I use the information provided by my detachment crime analyst 
regarding hotspots. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. When I conduct a street check, I ask the subject probing questions 
about any addiction issues. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. When I conduct a street check, I ask the subject probing questions 
about their housing situation. 1 2 3 4 5 
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 Never Rarely Some- times Often Always
4. When I conduct a street check, if the subject tells me they are 
homeless, I refer them to local housing services. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. When I conduct a street check, I electronically record all the intel 
I have gathered on the subject on PRIME. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. When I conduct a street check, I electronically record all the intel 
I have gathered on the subject’s apparent mental health conditions 
on PRIME. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. When I conduct a street check, I electronically record all the intel 
regarding the subjects addiction issues on PRIME. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. I discuss the content of conversations I have with subjects who 
are known to be chronic offenders with other members of the 
detachment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. When I arrest a person with a lengthy criminal record, I conduct a 
warned statement interview. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. The intelligence I gather when I have interviewed a suspect is 
recorded on PRIME. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. When I have had an informal discussion with a suspect, I record 
the information I have on PRIME. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. When I need intelligence on a chronic offender, I look to other 
members to better understand the background of the offender. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I attend watch briefings to increase my knowledge of current 
detachment priorities, such as chronic offenders and current crime 
hot spots. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. When I conduct a street check, I ask the subject probing 
questions about their apparent mental health condition. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I consult with the detachment crime analyst regarding crimes 
under investigation or crime trends. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. When I arrest a person with a lengthy criminal record, I take 
time to have an informal discussion about their life circumstances. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. When I conduct a street check, if the subject tells me they are 
drug addicted, I refer them to local addiction services. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. I have easy access to intelligence on chronic offenders. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. I am not kept informed about the offenders who are being 
targeted by the Crime Reduction Team. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. I am kept informed about current crime analysis findings 
through watch briefings. 1 2 3 4 5 
21. The detachment crime analyst attends briefings and informs my 
watch about current findings. 1 2 3 4 5 
22. I am not kept informed regarding current hot spots through 
watch briefings. 1 2 3 4 5 
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 Never Rarely Some- times Often Always
23. Intelligence on chronic offenders is stored on an electronic 
system that I have access to. 1 2 3 4 5 
24. I know the location of all the known drug houses in my patrol 
area. 1 2 3 4 5 
25. I conduct street checks near the drug houses and hot spots in my 
area. 1 2 3 4 5 
  
 
3. The section/unit I work in: (CHECK ONLY ONE) 
1. takes files as they come in exclusively and does not target pre-determined offenders of interest ☐ 
2. proactively targets offenders of interest only       ☐ 
3. mainly takes calls as they come in and occasionally proactively targets offenders of interest ☐ 
4. occasionally takes calls but mainly proactively targets offenders of interest   ☐ 
 
4. When I arrest a chronic offender, I prepare court reports that include: (CHECK ALL THAT 
APPLY) 
1.  I do not arrest chronic offenders     ☐ 
2.  information on the offender’s previous criminal history  ☐ 
3.  his/her negative police contacts (from Pirs)   ☐ 
4.  his/her negative police contacts (from Prime)    ☐ 
5.  his/her Federal and Provincial correctional records   ☐ 
6.  details regarding his/her history of probation breaches  ☐ 
7.  details regarding his/her history of warrants    ☐ 
8.  his/her mental health history     ☐ 
9.  his/her addiction history      ☐ 
10.  his/her employment history     ☐ 
11.  his/her current housing condition    ☐ 
 
5. When I learn during briefings that there has very recently been a number of business break and 
enters in my patrol area, I:  (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY) 
1. conduct patrols to these areas in between calls  ☐   
2. conduct street checks in this location   ☐   
3. go from call to call and do not alter my patrols  ☐   
4. write my files in this area     ☐ 
 
6. I have telephone numbers, addresses, and contact information on local drug addiction services 
ready at all times. 
  0. No ☐  1. Yes ☐ 
 
7. I have telephone numbers, addresses, and contact information on homeless shelters at the ready 
at all times. 
0. No ☐  1. Yes ☐ 
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8. I have telephone numbers, addresses, and contact information on mental health services at the 
ready at all times. 
0. No ☐  1. Yes ☐ 
 
9. During a typical shift, I generally write up my outstanding files: (check the one that applies 
BEST) 
1. at the scene of the file     ☐ 
2. a few blocks from the scene of the file  ☐ 
3. at a community police station   ☐ 
4. at the location of a specific crime hot spots  ☐ 
5. at another location      ☐ 
6. in the vicinity of a known drug house  ☐ 
 
10. In general, the number of street checks I conduct in the course of a typical block of shifts is: 
 
|______|______| # of street checks 
 
11. During a typical block of shifts, the number of times I conduct my patrols to the known problem 
residences in my area is: 
    |______|______| # of times per block of shifts 
 
12. Please rank order the following interventions used to interrupt an offender’s pattern of 
offending from the most effective to the least. Please place a ‘1’ next to the approach that you feel is 
the most effective and a ‘3’ for the intervention that you feel is third most effective. Rank only the 
top three. 
 
1. Incarceration   |______| 
2. Probation    |______| 
3. Conditional Sentence Order |______| 
4. Addiction treatment  |______| 
5. Housing    |______| 
6. Employment   |______| 
7. Mental health treatment  |______| 
 
13. To what extent do you think that any of the following will pose a significant challenge to the 
implementation of a Crime Reduction approach? 
 No 
Challenge 
Somewhat 
Challenging
Very 
Challenging
Buy-in from judges 1 2 3 
Buy-in from prosecutors 1 2 3 
Buy-in from corrections 1 2 3 
Buy-in from social services 1 2 3 
Buy-in from offenders 1 2 3 
Police resources 1 2 3 
Availability of community resources (eg: addiction treatment, housing) 1 2 3 
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14. My gender is:          male          female 
 
15. I have been a member of the RCMP for:  
1. 0 to 12 months   ☐  2. 13 to 24 months    ☐ 3. 2 to 4 years ☐ 4. Over 4 years  ☐ 
 
16. My rank is:  
1. Constable  ☐  4. Staff Sergeant ☐ 
2. Corporal  ☐  5. Inspector  ☐ 
3. Sergeant  ☐  6. Civilian staff ☐ 
 
17. I currently work in the following section/unit: 
1. General Duty  ☐  6. Drug Section  ☐ 
2. Crime Reduction Unit ☐  7. School Liaison  ☐ 
3. Robbery Section  ☐  8. Sex Crimes   ☐ 
4. Major Crimes  ☐  9. Traffic   ☐ 
5. Criminal Investigations ☐  10. Fraud   ☐ 
 
18. I have worked in my current section/unit for: 
1. 0 to 12 months ☐ 
2. 13 to 24 months ☐ 
3. 2 to 4 years  ☐ 
4. Over 4 years ☐ 
 
COMMENTS  
Please use this space to provide any additional comments you would like to make about crime reduction 
in your detachment and in the RCMP in general.   
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. 
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